Bringing the Passions Back In: The Emotions in Political PhilosophyRebecca Kingston, Leonard Ferry The rationalist ideal has been met with cynicism in progressive circles for undermining the role of emotion and passion in the public realm. By exploring the social and political implications of the emotions in the history of ideas, contributors examine new paradigms for liberalism and offer new appreciations of the potential for passion in political philosophy and practice. Bringing the Passions Back In draws upon the history of political theory to shed light on the place of emotions in politics; it illustrates how sophisticated thinking about the relationship between reason and passion can inform contemporary democratic political theory. |
Contents
| 3 | |
| 19 | |
2 Plato on Shame and Frank Speech in Democratic Athens | 40 |
Phronesis Rhetoric and Aristotles Passionate Practical Deliberation | 60 |
The Emotions in Aquinas Philosophical Psychology | 78 |
5 The Political Relevance of the Emotions from Descartes to Smith | 108 |
6 Passion Power and Impartiality in Hume | 126 |
Rousseau on the Passions | 145 |
8 Feelings in the Political Philosophy of JS Mill | 155 |
9 Emotions Reasons and Judgments | 172 |
10 The Politics of Emotion | 189 |
Notes | 209 |
| 243 | |
Contributors | 254 |
| 256 | |
Common terms and phrases
action affect akrasia anger apprehension Aquinas argues argument Aristotle Aristotle’s Athenian behaviour beliefs Callicles Cambridge causal Chapter character Cheryl Hall cognitive common constitutive contemporary David Hume deliberative democracy democratic Descartes desire dispositions distinction e-thos emotional responses ethical ethos evaluation example experience explain fear feelings Gorgias human and nonhuman human nature Hume Hume’s Humean important individual intellectual intentional component involves J.S. Mill Jean-Jacques Rousseau Jonah's justice Kant liberal liberal democratic logos Martha Nussbaum Mill Mill’s moral sentiment Nicomachean Ethics nonhuman animals normative Nussbaum object one’s pain parrhe parrhesia particular passions pathos Paul Ekman perception person perspective philosophers phronesis phronetic physiological pity Plato pleasure political theory psychological rational reason René Descartes requires rhetoric Richard Rorty role Rorty Rousseau sense sensitive appetite shame significant cause social Socrates Solomon soul speech structure suggests sympathy things tion truth understanding utilitarian virtue York