Deficits, Debt, and Democracy: Wrestling with Tragedy on the Fiscal CommonsThis timely book reveals that the budget deficits and accumulating debts that plague modern democracies reflect a clash between two rationalities of governance: one of private property and one of common property. The clashing of these rationalities at var |
Contents
1 | |
a theoretical framework | 23 |
3 Budget deficits Ricardian equivalence and macromicro supervenience | 47 |
4 Property rights societal tectonics and the fiscal commons | 68 |
5 Parliamentary assemblies as peculiar market bazaars | 91 |
6 Taxation fiscal politics and political pricing | 113 |
Other editions - View all
Deficits, Debt, and Democracy: Wrestling with Tragedy on the Fiscal Commons Richard E. Wagner No preview available - 2013 |
Deficits, Debt, and Democracy: Wrestling with Tragedy on the Fiscal Commons Richard E. Wagner No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
action aggregate alternative Amtrak based enterprises borrowing Buchanan budget deficits capital catallactic catallaxy centralized mindset choice claim collective commercial competition complex constitution of liberty contrast corporate cost democratic denoted elections electoral emergent entail expenditure explain fallacy of composition Figure fiscal commons fiscal responsibility flat tax formulation functional finance guardian syndromes ideology illustrated income increase individual instance institutional framework interac interaction legislative liability macro market bazaar market prices operate options orderly organized parade parliamentary assembly participants particular patterns pedestrians percent political economy political enterprises political entities political pricing politicians polity and economy polycentric presumption principle private property production programs public debt public finance public square rate tax rational reasonable reduced reflect regime regulation relationships require revenues Ricardian equivalence rules significant society sound finance spending structure substantive supervenience surely taxation taxpayers theory of public tion transactions treated voting Wagner