Democracy and RedistributionEmploying analytical tools borrowed from game theory, Carles Boix offers a complete theory of political transitions, in which political regimes ultimately hinge on the nature of economic assets, their distribution among individuals, and the balance of power among different social groups. Backed up by detailed historical work and extensive statistical analysis that goes back to the mid-nineteenth century, this book explains, among many other things, why democracy emerged in classical Athens. It also discusses the early triumph of democracy in both nineteenth-century agrarian Norway, Switzerland and northeastern America and the failure in countries with a powerful landowning class. |
Contents
A THEORY OF POLITICAL TRANSITIONS | 19 |
PROVING THE RESULTS OF THE INITIAL GAME | 60 |
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENTDEMOCRACY CORRELATION | 63 |
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE | 65 |
LIST OF POLITICAL REGIMES | 98 |
HISTORICAL EVIDENCE | 110 |
THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS GROWTH TRADE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS | 130 |
DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR | 171 |
THE STATE THE THREAT OF EXPROPRIATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENT | 188 |
CONCLUSIONS | 217 |
References | 225 |
Index | 237 |
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Common terms and phrases
actors agrarian agricultural sector Alpha Beta Alpha asset specificity authoritarian regime average beta coefficient cantons cantons of Switzerland capita income capital mobility century Chapter choice of political coefficient constitutional cost of repression countries decline democratic breakdown democratic outcome democratic regime democratic transition dictatorships distribution of assets electoral elites empirical equal exports expropriation family farms federal franchise Gini coefficient Gini index higher human capital impact incentive income inequality increase industrial inequality and asset institutions investment Level of turnout levels of inequality likelihood median voter middle class parliament parliamentarian Parliamentarism percent Percentage of GDP political regime political resources political transitions politicians poor population Predicted Probability presidential systems Probability of Democratic proportional representation Przeworski public sector redistributive Regime Transition repression costs result revolution revolutionary rich social societies strategy structure tax rate theoretical tion trade openness transfers Transitional Period universal suffrage urban variables vote wealthy World Bank