Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action, Volume 743All social theorists and philosophers who seek to explain human action have a 'model of man', a metaphysical view of human nature. Some make man a plastic creature of nature and nurture, some present him as the autonomous creator of his social world, some offer a compromise. Each view needs its own theory of scientific knowledge calling for philosophic appraisal and the compromise sets harder puzzles than either. Passive accounts of man, for example, have a robust notion of causal explanation but cannot either find or dispense with a self to apply them to. Active accounts rightly stress an autonomous self, but lack a proper concept of explanation. Martin Hollis takes these tensions and contrasts from the thought of sociologists, economists, and psychologists. He then develops a model of his own - one which seeks to connect personal and social identity through an ambitious theory of rational action and a priori knowledge, proposing a sense in which men can act freely and still be a subject for scientific explanation. |
Contents
Two models | 1 |
Nature and nurture | 23 |
The regularity of the moral world | 41 |
Lifes short comedy | 69 |
Personal identity and social identity | 87 |
Elements of action | 107 |
Reasons and motives | 123 |
The rational and the real | 143 |
Ideal understanding | 165 |
Envoi actor and context | 185 |
| 191 | |
| 197 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
A. J. Ayer active conception actor analytic-synthetic distinction assert assumption Autonomous behaviour belief best move Bolingbroke causal explanation causal laws cause ceteris paribus chapter character chess claim conflict context contingent criteria crucial defined depends distinction doubt duty economic empirical Enquirer epistemological essentially ethics experience explanandum external fact false goals homo psychologicus Hook human nature hypothesis idea ideal type individual instance intention interpretation judge knowledge Kriegspiel logic Logical Positivism London Lukes means Mind Minds problem motives natural law necessary truths normative explanation notion objective ontology passive conception person philosophy Plastic play Positivism principle priori problem proposition psychology question rational action real interests reasons for action relation role theory rules Ruritania S₂ seems sense Sinker Skinner smothered mate snag social sciences sociologists sociology sort statements Steven Lukes structures suicide thesis thought tion treat Trobriand Islands true trying Zweckrationalität