Reason in Human AffairsWhat can reason (or more broadly, thinking) do for us and what can't it do? This is the question examined by Herbert A. Simon, who received the 1978 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences "for his pioneering work on decision-making processes in economic organizations." The ability to apply reason to the choice of actions is supposed to be one of the defining characteristics of our species. In the first two chapters, the author explores the nature and limits of human reason, comparing and evaluating the major theoretical frameworks that have been erected to explain reasoning processes. He also discusses the interaction of thinking and emotion in the choice of our actions. In the third and final chapter, the author applies the theory of bounded rationality to social institutions and human behavior, and points out the problems created by limited attention span human inability to deal with more than one difficult problem at a time. He concludes that we must recognize the limitations on our capabilities for rational choice and pursue goals that, in their tentativeness and flexibility, are compatible with those limits. |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
ability action adaptation Adversary proceedings alleles alternatives altruistic behavior altruistic gene assumptions attention behave behavioral model biological bounded rationality cess chapter choice chromosome cognition competition complex conflict consequences course creatures culture Darwinian deal deme described difficulty docility E. O. Wilson economic effects emotion energy environment evolution evolutionary processes evolutionary theory evolving example expect fact fitness focusing forms genetic genotypes goals Hence human rationality important increase individual interaction intuitive issues Kampf kind knowledge large numbers least lems limited live matters mecha mechanisms Mein Kampf meiosis ment modal logic mutation natural selection niches nisms nonaltruists optimization organisms particular perhaps phenotypes political institutions population genetics Prisoner's Dilemma prob problems procedures produce progeny public policy real world reason require rewards rules of inference selfish gene simply social society solve species strategies suppose survive things tion tive trait groups utility function values variation weak altruism