The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation

Front Cover
MIT Press, 2013 - Medical - 456 pages

A neuroscientific perspective on the mind-body problem that focuses on how the brain actually accomplishes mental causation.

The issues of mental causation, consciousness, and free will have vexed philosophers since Plato. In this book, Peter Tse examines these unresolved issues from a neuroscientific perspective. In contrast with philosophers who use logic rather than data to argue whether mental causation or consciousness can exist given unproven first assumptions, Tse proposes that we instead listen to what neurons have to say.

Tse draws on exciting recent neuroscientific data concerning how informational causation is realized in physical causation at the level of NMDA receptors, synapses, dendrites, neurons, and neuronal circuits. He argues that a particular kind of strong free will and "downward" mental causation are realized in rapid synaptic plasticity. Such informational causation cannot change the physical basis of information realized in the present, but it can change the physical basis of information that may be realized in the immediate future. This gets around the standard argument against free will centered on the impossibility of self-causation. Tse explores the ways that mental causation and qualia might be realized in this kind of neuronal and associated information-processing architecture, and considers the psychological and philosophical implications of having such an architecture realized in our brains.

 

Contents

The Mind Body Problem Will Be Solved by Neuroscience
1
2 Overview of Arguments
11
3 A Criterial Neuronal Code Underlies Downward Mental Causation and Free Will
19
4 Neurons Impose Physical and Informational Criteria for Firing on Their Inputs
31
5 NMDA Receptors and a Neuronal Code Based on Bursting
79
6 Mental Causation as an Instance of Criterial Causation
115
7 Criterial Causation Offers a Neural Basis for Free Will
133
8 Implications of Criterial Causality for Mental Representation
151
Physical Evidence for Ontological Indeterminism
241
Ontological Indeterminism Undermines Kims Argument against the Logical Possibility of Mental Causation
247
Why There Are No Necessary A posteriori Propositions
257
Notes
261
Glossary
289
References
309
Author Index
411
Subject Index
443

Readiness Potentials and the Role of Conscious Willing
169
10 The Roles of Attention and Consciousness in Criterial Causation
183

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About the author (2013)

Peter Ulric Tse is Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience in the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences at Dartmouth College. He was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2014.