Saul KripkeAlan Berger This collection of essays on Saul Kripke and his philosophy is the first and only collection of essays to examine both published and unpublished writings by Kripke. Its essays, written by distinguished philosophers in the field, present a broader picture of Kripke's life and work than has previously been available to scholars of his thought. New topics covered in these essays include vacuous names and names in fiction, Kripke on logicism and de re attitude toward numbers, Kripke on the incoherency of adopting a logic, Kripke on colour words and his criticism of the primary versus secondary quality distinction, and Kripke's critique of functionalism. These essays not only present Kripke's basic arguments but also engage with the arguments and controversies engendered by his work, providing the most comprehensive analysis of his philosophy and writings available. This collection will become a classic in contemporary analytic philosophy. |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 15 | |
PART II Formal Semantics Truth Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Logic | 117 |
PART III Language and Mind | 209 |
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abstract accept actual argues argument assert atomic believes that London biconditionals c-fiber stimulation claim color computes F concept connectives contradictory beliefs counterfactual DEnglish discussion dispositionalism dispositionalist dispositions disquotational epistemically possible example exist express fact false fictional character formal system Frege function Holmes1 identity individual instances instantiated interpretation intuitionistic intuitionistic logic intuitive Kripke models Kripke’s Kripke’s puzzle language lectures linguistic London is pretty Londres est jolie mathematical meaning ascriptions metaphysically possible Millianism modal logic model theory Naming and Necessity necessary a posteriori necessary truth nondesignating notion numbers objects pain PCM computes Philosophical physical Pierre believes Pierre’s possible worlds predicate principle priori problem proper names properties proposition Putnam Puzzle about Belief quantum logic question Quine reference reject relation rigid designators rule Saul Kripke semantic sensations sense sentence sentential logic Sherlock Holmes Skeptical Solution speaker statements supposed Tarski things tion translation true truth value University Press Wittgenstein world-states yellow