The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Institutional Investors Can Make Corporate America More Democratic

Front Cover
University of Pennsylvania Press, Oct 6, 2000 - Business & Economics - 232 pages

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the structure of corporate ownership is undergoing major change. The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism chronicles the rise of fiduciary institutions—primarily public and private pension funds—which now own almost 50 percent of the equity of American corporations. In turn, approximately 50 percent of Americans either own stock individually or, more typically, have an ownership or retirement interest in these fiduciary institutions.

James P. Hawley and Andrew T. Williams argue that, because of their extensive diversification of ownership, fiduciary institutions have become "universal owners" with a significant stake in a broad cross-section of the largest publicly traded firms in the economy. Forced to evaluate portfolio-wide effects of individual firm actions, these institutions have a quasipublic policy interest in the long-term health and wellbeing of the whole society. As universal owners, fiduciary institutions are in a unique position to develop and pursue policies of virtuous efficiency, minimizing negative externalities and encouraging positive outcomes by the firms in their portfolios. In this way, they have the potential to make the firms in which they own stock more responsive to the needs of the Americans to whom they are responsible and thereby make those firms more democratic.

The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism investigates the nature of property and ownership in the modern corporate setting, the effects of the decline of traditional, personally held property in equity form, and the governance implications of the developing new form of corporate ownership.

 

Contents

The Universal Owner Stockholder as Stakeholder
1
Proxy Voting
30
The Rise of Institutional Ownership in the United States
42
The Finance Model and Its Implications for Corporate Governance
69
Critiques of the Finance Model Implications for Corporate Governance
82
Does Ownership Matter? The Link Between Active Ownership and Corporate Performance
101
Models of Monitoring and Corporate Governance
124
Policy Currents Regulatory and Proposed Regulatory Reforms and Voluntary Standards
147
Summary and Conclusion
166
Notes
179
Bibliography
211
Index
223
Acknowledgments
Copyright

Common terms and phrases