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Environment and Statecraft : The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making:

The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making
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Oxford University Press, Jan 9, 2003 - Business & Economics - 446 pages
Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do. A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behaviour appreciably. This book develops a theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this. The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing-that is, individually rational, collectively rational, and fair. The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change. The essential lesson of the book is that treaties should not just tell countries what to do. Treaties must make it in the interests of countries to behave differently. That is, they must restructure the underlying game. Most importantly, they must create incentives for states to participate in a treaty and for parties to comply.
  

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Contents

Introduction
1
The North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty and the Theory of International Cooperation
19
Transnational Cooperation Dilemmas
49
Games with Multiple Equilibria
85
Customary Rights and Responsibilities
106
International Environmental Agreements
133
The Treaty Participation Game
195
The Montreal Protocol
221
The Depth and Breadth of International Cooperation
292
Trade Leakage and Trade Linkage
307
The Side Payments Game
335
Summary
355
Global Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol
359
Afterword to the Paperback Edition on Global Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol
399
References
407
Index
423

Tipping Treaties
254
Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity
269
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making
Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making
Scott Barrett
No preview available - 2003

Common terms and phrases

accede acid rain agreed agreement Amendment Article assumption behavior Benedick benefit Canada CFCs Chapter chicken game choice choose climate change collective rationality compliance comply consensus Conservation Convention coordination game costs coun credible developing countries deviation dilemma game dominant strategy effect emissions enforcement enter into force environment environmental Equatorial Guinea equilibrium example free-riding full cooperative outcome Fur Seal Treaty gain global harm Helsinki ICCAT implementation important incentive increase international cooperation Japan Kyoto Protocol leakage limit ment mixed strategy Montreal Protocol multilateral nations negotiations non-compliance non-participation non-parties non-signatories number of countries ozone depletion ozone layer parties pelagic sealing percent play Abate play Pollute players preferences problem production Protection punishment ratified reason red card reduce requires rules Russia self-enforcing side payments signatories standards substances Suppose target theory threat tion trade restrictions tuna unilateral United whaling withdraw

References to this book

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References from web pages

Oran R. Young - Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of ...
[Access article in PDF]. Scott Barrett. 2002. Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ...
muse.jhu.edu/ demo/ global_environmental_politics/ v003/ 3.1young.html

JSTOR: Environment and Statecraft: Strategies of Environmental ...
Environment and Statecraft: Strategies of Environmental Treaty-Making. Jeffrey L. Dunoff. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, No. ...
links.jstor.org/ sici?sici=0002-9300(200401)98%3A1%3C224%3AEASSOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

Oxford Scholarship Online: Environment and Statecraft
Oxford Scholarship Online - a cross-searchable library containing the full text of over 1350 Oxford books
www.oxfordscholarship.com/ oso/ public/ content/ economicsfinance/ 9780199286096/ toc.html

Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty ...
Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making Book by Scott Barrett; 2005. Read Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of ...
www.questia.com/ PM.qst?a=o& d=110155858

Akademika - alt av fagbøker
Environment and Statecraft The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making av Scott Barrett How did the Montreal Protocol succeed in protecting the earth's ...
www.akademika.no/ vare.php?ean=9780199286096

Environment and Statecraft. The Strategy of Environmental Treaty ...
Environmental Conservation 31 (1): 84–90 © 2004 Foundation for Environmental Conservation. BOOK REVIEWS. DOI: 10.1017/S0376892904211225 ...
journals.cambridge.org/ production/ action/ cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=213356

Journal of International Relations & Development - Abstract of ...
Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making. Scott Barrett Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, xvii+427pp. ...
www.palgrave-journals.com/ jird/ journal/ v9/ n1/ abs/ 1800076a.html

Syllabus
The main reading for this course Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making , Oxford: Oxford University Press, ...
weber.ucsd.edu/ ~tgroves/ Econ182/ index.html

Environmental treaty-making addressed - News
Last night, Barrett's lecture involved a discussion of his new book, entitled "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," ...
www.dailycampus.com/ news/ 2002/ 10/ 18/ News/ Environmental.TreatyMaking.Addressed-300795.shtml

a37brx 2264..2265
Barrett S Environment and statecraft: the strategy of environmental treaty-making 947. Benko G, Strohmayer U (Eds) Human geography: a history for the 21st ...
www.envplan.com/ epa/ editorials/ a37brx.pdf

About the author (2003)

\
Scott Barrett is Professor of Environmental Economics and International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Bibliographic information

QR code for Environment and Statecraft : The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making
TitleEnvironment and Statecraft : The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making
Oxford scholarship online
AuthorScott Barrett
Editionillustrated, reprint
PublisherOxford University Press, 2003
ISBN0191531448, 9780191531446
Length446 pages
Subjects ›  › 

Business & Economics / Development / Sustainable Development
Business & Economics / Economics / General
Law / International
  
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