A Theory of JusticeSince it appeared in 1971, John Rawls's "A Theory of Justice" has become a classic. The author has now revised the original edition to clear up a number of difficulties he and others have found in the original book. Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition--justice as fairness--and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the social contract as a more satisfactory account of the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons. "Each person," writes Rawls, "possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." Advancing the ideas of Rousseau, Kant, Emerson, and Lincoln, Rawls's theory is as powerful today as it was when first published. |
Contents
CHAPTER I JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS | 3 |
2 The Subject of Justice | 6 |
3 The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice | 10 |
4 The Original Position and Justifications | 15 |
5 Classical Utilitarianism | 19 |
6 Some Related Contrasts | 24 |
7 Intuitionism | 30 |
8 The Priority Problem | 36 |
46 Further Cases of Priority | 263 |
47 The Precepts of Justice | 267 |
48 Legitimate Expectations and Moral Desert | 273 |
49 Comparison with Mixed Conceptions | 277 |
50 The Principle of Perfection | 285 |
CHAPTER VI DUTY AND OBLIGATION | 293 |
52 The Arguments for the Principles of Fairness | 301 |
53 The Duty to Comply with an Unjust Law | 308 |
9 Some Remarks Moral Theory | 40 |
CHAPTER II THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE | 47 |
11 Two Principles of Justice | 52 |
12 Interpretations of the Second Principle | 57 |
13 Democratic Equality and The Difference Principle | 65 |
14 Fair Equality of Opportunity and Pure Procedural Justice | 73 |
15 Primary Social Goods As the Basis the of Expectations | 78 |
16 Relevant Social Positions | 81 |
17 The Tendency to Equality | 86 |
The Principle of Fairness | 93 |
The Natural Duties | 98 |
CHAPTER III THE ORIGINAL POSITION | 102 |
21 The Presentation of Alternatives | 105 |
22 The Circumstances of Justice | 109 |
23 The Formal Constraints of the Concept of Right | 112 |
24 The Veil of Ignorance | 118 |
25 The Rationality of the Parties | 123 |
26 The Reasoning Leading to the Two Principles of Justice | 130 |
27 The Reasoning Leading to the Principle of Average Utility | 139 |
28 Some Difficulties with the Average Principle | 144 |
29 Some Main Grounds For the Two Principles of Justice | 153 |
30 Classical Utilitarianisms Impartiality and Benevolence | 160 |
Institutions | 169 |
CHAPTER IV EQUAL LIBERTY | 171 |
32 The Concept of Liberty | 176 |
33 Equal Liberty of Conscience | 180 |
34 Toleration and the Common Interest | 186 |
35 Toleration of the Intolerant | 190 |
36 Political Justice and The Constitution | 194 |
37 Limitations of Principle of Participation | 200 |
38 The Rule of Law | 206 |
39 The Priority of Liberty Defined | 214 |
40 The Kantian Interpretation | 221 |
CHAPTER V DISTRIBUTIVE SHARES | 228 |
42 Some Remarks About Economic Systems | 234 |
43 Background Institutions for Distributive Justice | 242 |
44 The Problem of Justice Between Generations | 251 |
45 Time Preference | 259 |
54 The Status of Majority Rule | 313 |
55 The Definition of Civil Disobedience | 319 |
56 The Definition of Conscientious Refusal | 323 |
57 The Justification of Civil Disobedience | 326 |
58 The Justification of Conscientious Refusal | 331 |
59 The Role of Civil Disobedience | 335 |
Ends | 345 |
CHAPTER VII GOODNESS AS RATIONALITY | 347 |
61 The Definition of Good for Simpler Cases | 350 |
62 A Note on Meaning | 355 |
63 The Definitions of Good for Plans of Life | 358 |
64 Deliberative Rationality | 365 |
65 The Aristotelian Principle | 372 |
66 The Definition of Good Applied to Persons | 380 |
67 SelfRespect Excellences and Shame | 386 |
68 Several Contrasts between the Right and the Good | 392 |
CHAPTER VIII THE SENSE OF JUSTICE | 397 |
70 THE Morality of Authority | 405 |
71 The Morality of Association | 409 |
73 Features of the Moral Sentiments | 420 |
74 The Connection Between Moral and Natural Attitudes | 425 |
75 The Principles of Moral Psychology | 429 |
76 The Problem of Relative Stability | 434 |
77 The Basis of Equality | 441 |
CHAPTER IX THE GOOD OF JUSTICE | 450 |
79 The Idea of Social Union | 456 |
80 The Problem of Envy | 464 |
81 Envy and Equality | 468 |
82 The Grounds for the Priority of Liberty | 474 |
83 Happiness and Dominant Ends | 480 |
84 Hedonism as a Method of Choice | 486 |
85 The Unity of the Self | 491 |
86 The Good of the Sense of Justice | 496 |
87 Concluding Remarks on Justification | 506 |
Conversion Table | 517 |
| 521 | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept advantage aims apply argument arrangements assume assumptions basic liberties basic structure circumstances citizens civil disobedience claims conception of justice considered judgments constitutional constraints contract doctrine course defined definition desire difference principle discussion distribution economic efficiency ends envy equal liberty ethical example expectations fact favored feelings further greater H. L. A. Hart human idea ideal individuals initial situation institutions interests interpretation intuitionism intuitive justice as fairness justified least less maximize means ments natural duty notion one's original position particular parties ples point of view political precepts preferences princi principle of fairness principle of utility principles of justice problem procedural justice question rational plan reason recognized reflective equilibrium regulated relevant rules scheme seems sense of justice standpoint suppose theory of justice things tion unjust utilitarian veil of ignorance W. G. Runciman Welfare Economics well-ordered society