Action in Perception
This book presents an argument that perception is something we do, not something that happens to us: not a process in the brain, but a skillful bodily activity. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us, writes Alva Noe. It is something we do. In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought - that perception is a kind of thoughtful activity. Touch, not vision, should be our model for perception. Perception is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skilful activity of the body as a whole. We enact our perceptual experience. To perceive, according to this enactive approach to perception, is not merely to have sensations; it is to have sensations that we understand. In Action in Perception, Noe investigates the forms this understanding can take. He begins by arguing, on both phenomenological and empirical grounds, that the content of perception is not like the content of a picture; the world is not given to consciousness all at once but is gained gradually by active inquiry and exploration. possession and exercise of practical bodily knowledge, and examines, among other topics, the problems posed by spatial content and the experience of colour. He considers the perspectival aspect of the representational content of experience and assesses the place of thought and understanding in experience. Finally, he explores the implications of the enactive approach for our understanding of the neuroscience of perception.
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animal apparent color appearance argued behavior blind spot brain causal change blindness chapter cognitive cognitive science color constancy color experience consciousness cortex cube Dennett Descartes detail enactive approach enactive view ence encounter environment example experiential blindness explain fact Gibson grasp Hurley and NoŽ idea inattentional blindness inverted spectrum kinesthesis light looks red modalities move movement normal O'Regan and NoŽ object one's optic ataxia P-properties patterns of sensorimotor perceive perceiver's perceptual content perceptual experience perceptual presence perspectival phenomenal phenomenology philosophical Philosophy of Perception picture possession problem properties proprioception qualia theory qualities reason relation respect to color retinal image rience sensations sense sensorimotor contingencies sensorimotor dependence sensorimotor knowledge sensorimotor skills sensory stimulation shape snapshot conception sort space spatial content subpersonal surface tactile things look Thompson thought tion tomato touch TVSS understand veridical vision visual cortex visual experience visual field visual system