Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect

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Oxford University Press, Sep 24, 1992 - Philosophy - 384 pages
A study of problems, all revolving around the subject of intellect in the philosophies of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, this book starts by reviewing discussions in Greek and early Arabic philosophy which served as the background for the three Arabic thinkers. Davidson examines the cosmologies and theories of human and active intellect in the three philosophers and covers such subjects as: the emanation of the supernal realm from the First Cause; the emanation of the lower world from the transcendent active intellect; stages of human intellect; illumination of the human intellect by the transcendent active intellect; conjunction of the human intellect with the transcendent active intellect; prophecy; and human immortality. Davidson shows that medieval Jewish philosophers and the Latin Scholastics had differing perceptions of Averroes because they happened to use works belonging to different periods of his philosophic career.

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Contents

1 Introduction
3
2 Greek and Arabic Antecedents
7
3 Alfarabi on Emanation the Active Intellect and Human Intellect
44
4 Avicenna on Emanation the Active Intellect and Human Intellect
74
5 Reverberations of the Theories of Alfarabi and Avicenna
127
6 Averroes on Emanation and on the Active Intellect as a Cause of Existence
220
7 Averroes on the Material Intellect
258
8 Averroes on the Active Intellect as the Cause of Human Thought
315
Index
357
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Page 263 - Plan for the publication of a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem...
Page 303 - For they say that these things are true according to philosophy but not according to the Catholic faith, as if there were two contrary truths and as if the truth of Sacred Scripture...
Page 349 - ... a bodily potency, then the reasons he mentions for this are possible ; but not everything which in its nature is possible can be done by man, for what is possible to man is well known. Most things which are possible in themselves are impossible for man, and what Is true of the prophet, that he can interrupt the ordinary course of nature, is impossible for man. but possible in itself; and because of this one need not assume that things logically impossible are possible for the prophets, and if...
Page 196 - ... and q', and so on. Then the total number of dollars spent for goods, ie S, is equal to pq + p'q' + etc. Since two things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, and since 5 = MV and also S = pq + p'q' + etc., therefore MV = pq + p'q
Page 123 - He recognizes the possibility of man's attaining instantaneous scientific knowledge without following scientific procedures, something rejected by Alfarabi and to be rejected by Averroes.
Page 88 - ... things equal to the same thing are equal to each other," or that the relation of different lengths each to a constant distance establishes their relation to each other.
Page 227 - Mover," reprinted in his Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion 1, ed. I. Twersky and G. Williams (Cambridge, Mass. 1973) 426, n. 60; below, p. 291. receives perfection in proportion to its rank in the hierarchy of existence. We may conjecture that, in Averroes...
Page 130 - ... one group came to slander philosophy, another to slander religion, and another to reconcile the [first] two [groups]. It seems that this [last] was one of his objects in his books; an indication that he wanted by this [procedure] to arouse minds is that he adhered to no one doctrine in his books but was an Ash'arite with the Ash'arites, a Sufi with the Sufis and a philosopher with the philosophers...
Page 48 - Arabic text), in Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. A. Hyman and J. Walsh (New York 1973) 215. Italian translation, with pagination of the Arabic indicated: Farabi, Epistola sull
Page 67 - The intellect which is in potentiality is some soul, or part of a soul, or one of the faculties of the soul, or something whose essence is ready and prepared to abstract the quiddities of all existing things and their forms from their matters, so that it makes all of them a form for itself or forms for itself. And those forms which are abstracted from their matters do not become abstracted from their matters in which their...

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