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able acquired appear attend becauſe belief body caſe cauſe centre colour common conceive conception connection conſider conſtitution correſponding cuſtom direction diſcover diſtance diſtinct double effect evident exiſtence experience extenſion external facts faculty fame feeling figure firſt follows give given habit hath human ideas images imagination impreſſion ject kind knowledge language laſt laws leſs light look manner material matter means mentioned mind moſt muſt nature nerves never notions object obſerved operations optic organ original perceive perception philoſophers points poſition preſent principles probable produced proper qualities rays reaſon reflection regard reſemble retina ſame SECT ſee ſeems ſeen ſenſation ſenſe ſhall ſhould ſignified ſigns ſingle ſmell ſome ſquint ſubject ſuch ſuggeſts ſuppoſe ſyſtem taſte ther theſe things thoſe thought tion touch true underſtanding uſe viſible viſible figure viſion
Page 4 - Could we obtain a distinct and full history of all that hath passed in the mind of a child from the beginning of life and sensation, till it grows up to the use of reason ; how its infant faculties began to work, and how they brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions, and sentiments, which we find in ourselves when we come to be capable of reflection : this would be a treasure of natural history, which...
Page 158 - I have here supposed that my reader is acquainted with that great modern discovery, which is at present universally acknowledged by all the inquirers into natural philosophy: namely, that light and colours, as apprehended by the imagination, are only ideas in the mind, and not qualities that have any existence in matter.
Page i - That nothing is perceived but what is in the mind which perceives it : That we do not really perceive things that are external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted upon the mind, which are called impressions and ideas.
Page 317 - And now being lately couched of his other eye, he says, that objects at first appeared large to this eye, but not so large as they did at first to the other ; and looking upon the same object with both eyes, he thought it looked about twice as large as with the first couched eye only, but not double that we can any way discover.
Page 5 - The labyrinth may be too intricate, and the thread too fine, to be traced through all its windings; but, if we stop where we can trace it no farther, and secure the ground we have gained, there is no harm done; a quicker eye may in time trace it farther.
Page 5 - ... be given but the will of our Maker. This may be truly called an analysis of the human faculties, and till this is performed, it is in vain we expect any just system of the mind, that is, an enumeration of the original powers and laws of our constitution, and an explication from them of the various phenomena of human nature.
Page 331 - ... nerves meet before they come into the brain, the fibres on the right side of both nerves uniting there, and after union going thence into the brain in the nerve which is on the right side of the head, and the fibres on the left side of both nerves uniting in the same place, and after union going into the brain in the nerve which is on the left side of the head, and these two nerves meeting in the brain in...
Page 431 - When I perceive a tree before me, my faculty of seeing gives me not only a notion or simple apprehension of the tree, but a belief of its existence, and of its figure, distance, and magnitude; and this judgment or belief is not got by comparing ideas, it is included in the very nature of the perception.
Page 4 - ... sensation, till it grows up to the use of reason; how its infant faculties began to work, and how they brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions, and sentiments, which we find in ourselves when we come to be capable of reflection, this would be a treasure of natural history, which would probably give more light into the human faculties, than all the systems of philosophers about them since the beginning of the world.