Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will
John Baer, James C. Kaufman, Roy F. Baumeister
Oxford University Press, Feb 25, 2008 - Psychology - 368 pages
Do people have free will, or this universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? How and why might a sense of free will have evolved? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like automatons, and they don't treat one another as they might treat robots. While acknowledging many constraints and influences on behavior, people nonetheless act as if they (and their neighbors) are largely in control of many if not most of the decisions they make. Belief in free will also underpins the sense that people are responsible for their actions. Psychological explanations of behavior rarely mention free will as a factor, however. Can psychological science find room for free will? How do leading psychologists conceptualize free will, and what role do they believe free will plays in shaping behavior? In recent years a number of psychologists have tried to solve one or more of the puzzles surrounding free will. This book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at ways leading psychologists from all branches of psychology deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will and the importance of consciousness in free will. It also includes commentaries by leading philosophers on what psychologists can contribute to long-running philosophical struggles with this most distinctly human belief. These essays should be of interest not only to social scientists, but to intelligent and thoughtful readers everywhere.
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Interacting with a new kind of responsability we hope to deter others from comparable evils in th future for example wars by publicly enforcing a policy of rooting out male and real evil.
3 Determined and Free
The Construction of Free Will
5 Free Will Consciousness and Cultural Animals
6 Reconstrual of Free Will From the Agentic Perspective of Social Cognitive Theory
7 Free Will Is Unnatural
8 The Automaticity Juggernautor Are We Automatons After All?
11 Self Is Magic
12 Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking About Free Will
13 Whose Will? How Free?
14 Free Will as a Proportion of Variance
The Yin and Yang of the Creative Life
16 Free Will Requires Determinism
17 The Fear of Determinism
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action activity agency agentic Albert Bandura argued automatic processes B. F. Skinner Bandura Bargh Baumeister biological brain Cambridge causal causes choice cognitive psychology compatibilism compatibilists concept of free creativity culture decisions Dennett determinism deterministic Dweck effect Ego depletion entity theorists environment environmental epiphenomenal evidence evolutionary example experience experimental explain feel flex freedom Freedom Evolves function genetic goals hard problem human behavior illusion of conscious incremental theorists individual influence intention John Bargh Journal of Personality Koriat libertarian free Libet magic memory mental mind moral responsibility motivation nature neural neuronal nonconscious one’s outcomes Oxford University Press participants people’s Personality and Social perspective philosophical predict problem of free punishment question readiness potential role Roy Baumeister Schooler scientists self-determination self-efficacy self-regulation self-theories sense situation social cognition Social Psychology stop-signal studies subjects task theory things thought tion unconscious volition volitional control Wegner York