What is consciousness? The answer to this question has been pondered upon, grappled with, and argued about since time immemorial. There has never been an answer that achieved consensus; certainly philosophers have never agreed.In this book, William Lycan defends an original theory of mind that he calls "homuncular functionalism." He argues that human beings are "functionally organized information-processing systems" who have no non-physical parts or properties. However, Lycan also recognizes the subjective phenomenal qualities of mental states and events, and an important sense in which mind is "over and above" mere chemical matter. Along the way, Lycan reviews some diverse philosophical accounts of consciousness-including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casta eda, among others-and demonstrates how what is valuable in each opposing view can be accommodated within his own theory.
Consciousness is Lycan's most ambitious book, one that has engaged his attention for years. He handles a fascinating subject in a unique and undoubtedly controversial manner that will make this book a mainstay in the field of philosophy of mind.
Consciousness, with these earlier works, is a Bradford Book.
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The Problem of the Inputs and the Outputs
Two Alternative Strategies
Adverbialism Syntax and Semantics
Phenomenal Individuals from a Materialist Point of View
Sellars Grain Argument
Argument G and Science
Sensa and Microphysics
Homunctionalism against Commonsense Relationalism
What Is It Like to Be an Unsound Argument against Materialism?
The Move to Funny Facts
An Argument against Perspectival Facts
Events and the Banana Peel Again
The Rest of Subjectivity