Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995 - Bankruptcy - 134 pages
The Mexican Crisis of 1994/5 came as a rude surprise to the international policy-making community. It revealed serious confusion over how markets, governments, and multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund should deal with financial crises in heavily-indebted developing economies. It laid bare a remarkable lack of planning for financial crises in today's world of globalized bond and equity markets. This report analyses various approaches to coping better with Mexico-style crises.
Bankruptcy in theory and practice
Bankruptcy in the sovereign setting
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absolute priority agreed approval arbitral tribunal Article VIII(2)(b assets automatic stay bankruptcy codes bankruptcy law bankruptcy procedure bankruptcy proceedings bond finance Chapter 11 claims clause Club negotiations collateral commercial committee consolidation period creditor countries crises debt contracts debt crisis debt instruments debt relief debt restructuring debt service debtor country debtor in possession dissident creditors economic efficient bankruptcy Eichengreen enforcement ex-ante ex-post efficiency example financial distress firm foreign funds impose incentive institutions interest rate international law investors involved issues jurisdiction lenders lending liquidation loan agreement London Business School London Club moral hazard multilateral national courts obligations option orderly workout Paris Club parties payments possible private creditors problems property rights proposals recourse renegotiation reorganization repayment require rescheduling restructuring package restructuring process role secured secured creditors settlement sovereign debt sovereign immunity standstill state's Torous treaty unilateral United Kingdom World Bank writedowns