Democratic Choice and Taxation: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
This work examines tax policies and tax systems as they arise from democratic choices, set against the background of a market economy. Professors Hettich and Winer find that democratic institutions yield complex tax systems with features that follow a varied but predictable pattern. In developing their analysis, the authors use formal modelling of voting behavior, emphasizing recent advances in the theory of probabilistic voting. This book differs from the available tax literature by relating fiscal choices directly to voting and by examining tax systems in democratic countries from a variety of perspectives. While the authors primarily focus on explaining observed features of tax systems, they also devote considerable space to the discussion of the welfare and efficiency effects of taxation in the presence of collective choice, and to a review of other models and of the related literature. In addition, they use computational general equilibrium analysis and statistical research on national and state governments in the US and Canada to link theory to empirical data.
Cosa dicono le persone - Scrivi una recensione
Nessuna recensione trovata nei soliti posti.
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
administration costs altemative analysis approach assumed budget restraint Canada Canadian capital changes chapter coefﬁcient collective choice conceming constraints curves deadweight losses debt deﬁned deﬁnition discussion economic effects efﬁciency electoral empirical endogenous equilibrium tax estimating equation excess burden expected vote expenditures ﬁgure ﬁrst ﬁrst-order conditions ﬁscal ﬁscal system framework govemment govemment’s income tax increase indifference curves individual inﬂuence weights interest groups Laffer curves Lagrange multiplier Leviathan Lindahl Lindahl equilibrium loss in support marginal political maximize median voter Nash equilibrium normative optimal tax Pareto set party personal income policy instruments policy outcomes political competition political cost political inﬂuence probabilistic voting model problem provides public sector rate bands reﬂect Representation Theorem representative representative democracy revenue sources revenue structure self-selection signiﬁcant special provisions speciﬁc tariff tax bases tax expenditures tax policy tax rates Tax Reform tax structure tax system taxation taxpayers theoretical theory tion welfare economics YRATE