Dictators and their Secret PoliceHow do dictators stay in power? When, and how, do they use repression to do so? Dictators and their Secret Police explores the role of the coercive apparatus under authoritarian rule in Asia - how these secret organizations originated, how they operated, and how their violence affected ordinary citizens. Greitens argues that autocrats face a coercive dilemma: whether to create internal security forces designed to manage popular mobilization, or defend against potential coup. Violence against civilians, she suggests, is a byproduct of their attempt to resolve this dilemma. Drawing on a wealth of new historical evidence, this book challenges conventional wisdom on dictatorship: what autocrats are threatened by, how they respond, and how this affects the lives and security of the millions under their rule. It offers an unprecedented view into the use of surveillance, coercion, and violence, and sheds new light on the institutional and social foundations of authoritarian power. |
Contents
Introduction | 3 |
A theory of coercive institutions and state violence | 17 |
Organizing coercion in Taiwan | 75 |
Organizing coercion in the Philippines | 112 |
Organizing coercion in South Korea | 141 |
Coercive institutions and repression in Taiwan | 179 |
Coercive institutions and repression in the Philippines | 211 |
Coercive institutions and repression in South Korea | 237 |
coercion outside East Asia | 271 |
Conclusion | 292 |
A note on sources | 307 |
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Common terms and phrases
alternative explanations American Armed Forces Army arrested authoritarian autocrats Chapter Chen Chiang Ching-kuo Chiang Kai-shek China Cholla Chun Doo Hwan Chun’s civilians Closer Than Brothers coercive agents coercive apparatus coercive institutional design Communist competition coordination coup coup-proofing created Defense Democracy Democratization detainee dominant perceived threat East Germany elite threats faction fragmentation and exclusivity Human Rights incentives intelligence capacity internal security apparatus ISAFP Japanese KCIA Kim Dae Jung Kim Jong-pil KMT’s Kwangju Kyongsang leaders levels of violence mainland Manila Marcos martial law McCoy military Nationalist native Taiwanese officers operations organizational organizations Park Chung Hee Park’s party Philippines political popular threat popular unrest population pre-emptive President protest Quezon City reforms regime regime’s regional Report repression Rhee rule Saddam Security Command security forces Seoul socially exclusive South Korea Studies surveillance Taipei Taipei to Washington Taiwan targeted threat perceptions tion U.S. Department United York Yushin