Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Social Neuroscience and International Relations
Face-to-face diplomacy has long been the lynchpin of world politics, yet it is largely dismissed by scholars of International Relations as unimportant. Marcus Holmes argues that dismissing this type of diplomacy is in stark contrast to what leaders and policy makers deem as essential and that this view is rooted in a particular set of assumptions that see an individual's intentions as fundamentally inaccessible. Building on recent evidence from social neuroscience and psychology, Holmes argues that this assumption is problematic. Marcus Holmes studies some of the most important moments of diplomacy in the twentieth century, from 'Munich' to the end of the Cold War, and by showing how face-to-face interactions allowed leaders to either reassure each other of benign defensive intentions or pick up on offensive intentions, his book challenges the notion that intentions are fundamentally unknowable in international politics, a central idea in IR theory.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
ability able action actors agreement argues assess behavior Booth and Wheeler brain Bush Camp David Carter causal Chamberlain chapter Cold Cold War convey costly signals Dayan diplo diplomats discussion emotional empathy Europe example face-to-face diplomacy face-to-face encounter face-to-face interactions face-to-face meetings George H.W. Bush German unification Germany Germany’s Hitler Hitler’s intentions Iacoboni important importantly individuals intention beliefs intention understanding interac international politics interpersonal intuitions Israel Israeli Kohl leaders Malta Matlock ment mental minds mirror neurons mirroring system NATO negotiations neuroscience neuroscientists Neville Chamberlain notes nuclear occurred other’s outcome particular peace perspective Phipps position Pouliot problem of intentions psychology Quandt Reagan and Gorbachev regarding Reynolds Robert Gates role Sadat Sadat and Begin Sarotte Savranskaya security dilemma Shultz side significant simulation sincere social social neuroscience Soviet Union specific intentions strategy suggests summit theory tions to-face trust ultimately United Wendt Yarhi-Milo Zelikow and Rice