Game Theory: Decisions, Interaction and EvolutionThis book is an introduction to game theory from a mathematical perspective. It is intended to be a ?rst course for undergraduate students of mathematics, but I also hope that it will contain something of interest to advanced students or researchers in biology and economics who often encounter the basics of game theory informally via relevant applications. In view of the intended audience, the examples used in this book are generally abstract problems so that the reader is not forced to learn a great deal of a subject – either biology or e- nomics – that may be unfamiliar. Where a context is given, these are usually “classical” problems of the subject area and are, I hope, easy enough to follow. The prerequisites are generally modest. Apart from a familiarity with (or a willingness to learn) the concepts of a proof and some mathematical no- tion, the main requirement is an elementary understanding of probability. A familiarity with basic calculus would be useful for Chapter 6 and some parts of Chapters 1 and 8. The basic ideas of simple ordinary di?erential equations are required in Chapter 9 and, towards the end of that chapter, some familiarity with matrices would be an advantage – although the relevant ideas are brie?y described in an appendix. |
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Contents
| 101 | |
| 107 | |
| 111 | |
| 114 | |
Infinite Dynamic Games | 118 |
| 121 | |
73 Subgame Perfection | 125 |
74 Folk Theorems | 129 |
| 31 | |
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| 132 | |
| 136 | |
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| 140 | |
83 Games Against the Field | 144 |
| 148 | |
85 ESSs and Nash Equilibria | 153 |
| 157 | |
87 Existence of ESSs | 160 |
| 165 | |
92 Twostrategy Pairwise Contests | 168 |
| 171 | |
94 Games with More Than Two Strategies | 174 |
| 179 | |
Appendixes | 186 |
| 189 | |
| 193 | |
Solutions | 204 |
| 235 | |
| 237 | |
| 239 | |
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Common terms and phrases
affine transformation argmax assume asymptotically stable backward induction behavioural strategy best response choice condition corresponding Cournot decision node decision tree defined Definition denote Dilemma dime discount factor dominated strategies duopoly dynamic game dynamic programming dynamical system eigenvalues ESSs evolutionary Example Exercise expected payoff finite Firm fixed point future payoff game theory game tree given gives individual Iterated Prisoners linear linearised lotteries Markov Decision Processes Markov strategy Matching Pennies maximise mixed strategy Nash equilibrium strategy nickel offspring optimal strategy outcome pairwise contest game payoff table perfect Nash equilibrium play population game population profile probability problem Proof pure strategies pure strategy Nash replicator dynamics rôle shown in Figure solution solve specifies stage game static game stochastic stochastic game strategic form strategy Nash equilibrium strategy pair strategy set subgame perfect Nash Suppose two-player game
