Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionCongratulations to Elinor Ostrom, Co-Winner of The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009! The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. |
Contents
A challenge | 23 |
Interdependence independent action and collective action | 38 |
Framing inquiry | 45 |
Studying institutions in field settings | 55 |
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests | 61 |
223578 | 65 |
Huerta irrigation institutions | 69 |
13 | 71 |
CHAPTER 5 | 143 |
CHAPTER 2 | 146 |
A Sri Lankan fishery | 149 |
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka | 157 |
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries | 173 |
CHAPTER 6 | 182 |
A framework for analyzing institutional choice | 192 |
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences | 214 |
21 | 78 |
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines | 82 |
33 | 86 |
Similarities among enduring selfgoverning CPR institutions | 88 |
23 | 114 |
The entrepreneurship game | 127 |
The polycentric publicenterprise game | 133 |
AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY | 220 |
245 | |
256 | |
271 | |
278 | |
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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Elinor Ostrom Limited preview - 2015 |
Common terms and phrases
acre-feet acre-foot activities affect agencies agreement Alanya Alicante allocate analysis arenas behavior Bodrum California canal Central Basin Chapter collective action collective-choice common-pool resources commons constitutional-choice court CPR institutions CPR situations decisions design principles developed devised dilemma discount rates discussed economic efforts farmers fishers fishing Gal Oya groundwater basins huertas incentives individuals initial inshore fisheries institutional arrangements institutional change involved irrigation irrigation systems Izmir land litigation located Mawelle ment models monitoring and enforcement Murcia norms obtain officials operational rules organize Orihuela Ostrom outcomes participants prisoner's dilemma pumpers pumping Raymond Basin replenishment district resource system resource units rotation saltwater intrusion sanctions set of rules share situational variables Sri Lanka status quo rules strategies structure substantial supply theoretical theory tion Törbel transformation costs Turia River Uphoff Valencia village water producers water rights watermaster WBWA West Basin Water yes yes yes zanjera