Institutional and Organizational Analysis: Concepts and ApplicationsWhat explains the great variability in economic growth and political development across countries? Institutional and organizational analysis has developed since the 1970s into a powerful toolkit, which argues that institutions and norms rather than geography, culture, or technology are the primary causes of sustainable development. Institutions are rules that recognized authorities create and enforce. Norms are rules created by long-standing patterns of behavior, shared by people in a society or organization. They combine to play a role in all organizations, including governments, firms, churches, universities, gangs, and even families. This introduction to the concepts and applications of institutional and organizational analysis uses economic history, economics, law, and political science to inform its theoretical framework. Institutional and organizational analysis becomes the basis to show why the economic and political performance of countries worldwide have not converged, and reveals the lessons to be learned from it for business, law, and public policy. |
Contents
Overview of the Book | 11 |
Figures | 12 |
From Institutions to Economic Outcomes | 25 |
Institutions and Property Rights | 31 |
Property Rights and Transaction Costs | 58 |
xiii | 81 |
From Economic Outcomes to Political Performance | 109 |
PII A1 Sample spatial model | 127 |
31 | 267 |
Development | 273 |
Institutional Deepening | 285 |
33 | 313 |
Argentina Brazil | 319 |
Conclusion | 347 |
| 353 | |
| 354 | |
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2010 Constitution actions actors agency Alston analysis Articles of Confederation assets ballot behavior benefits Brazil bureaucracy Chapter Coase Coase Theorem committee competition complex Congress constraints contract coordinate core beliefs countries created critical transition deadweight losses decision determine dominant network economic and political effect election electoral enforcement example executive expected firm framework given impact important incentives individuals influence information asymmetries institutional change institutional deepening institutions and norms interaction interest groups investments judges judicial independence judicial review judiciary leadership legislation Libecap literature majority marginal models organizational organizations outcomes oversight parties players preferences president presidential presidential systems principal principal-agent principal-agent problem production redistribution reform reputation requires result role Sáenz Peña law social choice theory society specific status quo structure Supreme Court theory tion trajectory transaction costs two-party system United vote voters Weingast window of opportunity