Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical Study
Are inequalities of income created by the free market just? In this book Serena Olsaretti examines two main arguments that justify those inequalities: the first claims that they are just because they are deserved, and the second claims that they are just because they are what free individuals are entitled to. Both these arguments purport to show, in different ways, that giving responsible individuals their due requires that free market inequalities in incomes be allowed. Olsaretti argues, however, that neither argument is successful, and shows that when we examine closely the principle of desert and the notions of liberty and choice invoked by defenders of the free market, it appears that a conception of justice that would accommodate these notions, far from supporting free market inequalities, calls for their elimination. Her book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in political philosophy, political theory and normative economics.
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Chapter 1 Desert and justifications of the market
Chapter 2 Incentive payments and compensatory desert
Chapter 3 Productive contributions and deserved market rewards
Chapter 4 Liberty and entitlements in the libertarian justification of the free market
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