Liberty, Desert and the Market: A Philosophical StudyAre inequalities of income created by the free market just? In this book Serena Olsaretti examines two main arguments that justify those inequalities: the first claims that they are just because they are deserved, and the second claims that they are just because they are what free individuals are entitled to. Both these arguments purport to show, in different ways, that giving responsible individuals their due requires that free market inequalities in incomes be allowed. Olsaretti argues, however, that neither argument is successful, and shows that when we examine closely the principle of desert and the notions of liberty and choice invoked by defenders of the free market, it appears that a conception of justice that would accommodate these notions, far from supporting free market inequalities, calls for their elimination. Her book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in political philosophy, political theory and normative economics. |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 10 | |
Chapter 2 Incentive payments and compensatory desert | 39 |
Chapter 3 Productive contributions and deserved market rewards | 62 |
Chapter 4 Liberty and entitlements in the libertarian justification of the free market | 86 |
a critique | 109 |
beyond libertarians and their critics | 137 |
Conclusion | 162 |
Bibliography | 170 |
Index | 181 |
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Common terms and phrases
acceptable alternative account of voluntariness agent appeal argue Audrey Burt cab-driver chapter choose circumstantial luck coercion comparative justice compensatory desert argument compensatory desert claims concept of desert concern contention contribution argument critique defend defensible principle definition of freedom desert theorists desert-based differential deserts distinction distributive justice economic rents endorse entitlement-based fact Feinberg free market society freedom and voluntariness full self-ownership G. A. Cohen incentive payments incomes individuals inequalities insofar interference interpretation of desert Jan Narveson judgements justice requires justify labour Lamont left-libertarians libertarian defence liberty market rewards Miller moral moral responsibility moralised definition Narveson negative freedom non-voluntary notion of desert Nozick one’s pecuniary externalities people’s person principle of desert principle of justice private property rights productive contribution Rawls reap relevant result right-libertarians rights-definition of freedom rights-definition of voluntariness Scott Arnold Sher someone Steiner suggest theory of justice threats unfree Vallentyne voluntariness requirement voluntary choice Wilt Chamberlain