Making Sense of Subsidiarity: How Much Centralization for Europe?.Making Sense of Subsidiarity goes right to the heart of many of the tensions now facing the EU. The principle articulates a presumption that the powers of EU institutions should be limited to those that cannot be adequately performed by its member states. This Report argues that until detailed arguments for and against centralization are made, the principle remains an incomplete guide to decisions as to where power should reside. Sections cover: labour mobility and its implications for the centralization of income tax and social security; economic integration and the Social Chapter; fiscal policy, macroeconomic stabilization and the Maastricht rules; environmental policy; merger policy; and European agriculture. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
The Allocation of Powers in the European Community | 13 |
Tables | 29 |
The Principles of Subsidiarity | 35 |
Figures | 47 |
Does the Tiebout Hypothesis | 59 |
Centralization and Accountability | 64 |
Social Europe Social Dumping and Subsidiarity | 101 |
Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilization | 117 |
Subsidiarity and Regulatory Policy | 135 |
Concluding Remarks | 161 |
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Common terms and phrases
accountability agriculture areas arguments benefits budget cantons capital income capital mobility cash-flow tax central authority central government Chapter citizens Common Agricultural Policy competences consumers coordination costs credible decentralization Decentralized Government decisions degree of preference distortions EC countries EC level economic effects efficient environmental Europe European Community example factor mobility federal firms fiscal competition fiscal externalities fiscal policy Germany groups immobile implementation incentives increase individuals investment jurisdictions labour markets labour mobility large number less lobbying localities Maastricht Treaty macroeconomic marginal minimum wage mobile capital mobile factors moral hazard outcome particular political pollution preference for public preference they report principle of subsidiarity problem production re-election redistribution reduced regulation regulatory regulatory capture returns to scale second-best Single European Act social dumping social protection spillovers standards Switzerland tax base tax competition tax rates taxation Tiebout hypothesis Tiebout model Treaty of Rome voting welfare wider public interest workers



