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CHAPTER 1 TOWARD A NEW INSTITUTIONAL EcoNoMics
PEER GROUPS AND SIMPLE HIERARCHIES
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adaptive advantages agreement antitrust argument assessment assets assumes attributable auditing bargaining behavior bounded rationality capital market ceteris paribus Chapter collusion competition complex condition conglomerate contingent claims contracts corporate decision decision-making default failure discussion distortions divisionalized divisions dominant firm economic economies of scale effects efficiency employment relation enforcement enterprise entrants entry exchange factors favor first-mover advantages ﬂow idiosyncratic incentive individual industry inﬂuence information impactedness inside contracting interfirm internal labor markets internal organization involved issues large firms learning-by-doing limited M-form market failure markets and hierarchies ment merger modes monopolistic monopoly moral hazard multidivisional oligopolistic oligopoly operating opportunism opportunistic organization form organizational failures framework organizational innovations outcomes parties peer group performance posed potential price discrimination problems profit profit maximization realized reasons requires respect result risk Section sequential simple hierarchy small-numbers stage Stigler strategic supply technological tion transaction costs types uncertainty vertical integration workers