Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty): Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session ....
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979 - Arms control - 1610 pages
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able achieve advantage agree agreement aircraft ALLEN allies American answer arms assistant Backfire balance believe bomber budget build Chairman STENNIS committee concern consider continue correct count cruise missile decision defense deploy don't effect equal essential equivalence fact follows give going HAIG hearings heavy ICBM important improvements increase interest issue Joint Chiefs JONES judgment launch limit look mean military negotiations nuclear percent period permitted PERRY position present problem programs protocol question range reason record regard SALT SALT II Treaty Secretary BROWN Senator BYRD Senator CANNON Senator COHEN Senator CULVER Senator HART Senator JACKSON Senator JEPSEN Senator NUNN Senator THURMOND Senator TOWER Senator WARNER side Soviet Union Staff statement strategic forces talking Thank things tion treaty trying understand United verification warheads weapons
Page 41 - The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.
Page 150 - Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Page 46 - TWO agreement which deals with the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In view of the possible implications of the noncircumvention clause for Alliance cooperation, the United States reiterates what it has specifically stated in Alliance consultations during the negotiations, that is, the non-circumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration...
Page 32 - Brooks. (Whereupon, at 12 :15 pm, the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 pm, this same day.) AFTERNOON SESSION The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr.
Page 24 - ... the Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the antiballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union...
Page 46 - ... cooperation, the United States reiterates what it has specifically stated in Alliance consultations during the negotiations, that is, the noncircumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with its Allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization. The United States believes that, in practice, the noncircumvention provision, which it will apply as stated below, will not interfere with continued nuclear and conventional cooperation with its Allies.
Page 9 - No arms limitation agreement can ever be absolutely verifiable. The relevant test is not an abstract ideal, but the practical standard of whether we can determine compliance adequately to safeguard our security — that is, whether we can identify attempted evasion if it occurs on a large enough scale to pose a significant risk, and whether we can do so in time to mount a sufficient response. Meeting this test is what I mean by the term "adequate verification.
Page 337 - L. GOSS— Resumed Mr. ASPINALL. Due to the fact that the gentleman from Oregon has to leave, I will yield to him. Mr. WYATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend all three of you gentlemen for your presentation and since I was in Oregon yesterday and was unable to attend the hearing yesterday I made no statement on this proposal, I would like to advise you that I heartily commend you for this project. I think perhaps as the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Udall, stated, this is...
Page 6 - US advantages in other characteristics; and the US posture Is not in fact, and is not seen as, inferior In performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.