Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty): Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session ... |
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Admiral HAYWARD agree aircraft ALLEN allies arms control assistant to Senator Backfire bomber balance ballistic missiles believe billion capability Chairman STENNIS Chiefs of Staff committee concern context correct cruise missile carrier deploy deployment deterrent essential equivalence Frank Gaffney gentlemen going HAIG hard target ICBM ICBM's improvements increase Joint Chiefs JONES judgment launchers limit M-X MISSILE military Minuteman Minuteman III MIRV'ed modernization mutual assured destruction NATO negotiations number of warheads percent PERRY programs protocol question ratify reentry vehicles SALT II Treaty Secretary BROWN Senator BYRD Senator CANNON Senator COHEN Senator CULVER Senator EXON Senator GOLDWATER Senator HART Senator HUMPHREY Senator JACKSON Senator JEPSEN Senator LEVIN Senator MORGAN Senator NUNN Senator THURMOND Senator TOWER Senator WARNER silo Soviet strategic Soviet Union statement strategic forces strategic systems submarines talking testimony Thank theater nuclear threat throw weight tion understand United verification Vladivostok Warsaw Pact
Popular passages
Page 37 - The range of which a cruise missile is capable is the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.
Page 146 - Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Page 42 - TWO agreement which deals with the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In view of the possible implications of the noncircumvention clause for Alliance cooperation, the United States reiterates what it has specifically stated in Alliance consultations during the negotiations, that is, the non-circumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration...
Page 28 - Brooks. (Whereupon, at 12 :15 pm, the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 pm, this same day.) AFTERNOON SESSION The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr.
Page 20 - ... the Congress recognizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the antiballistic missile treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union...
Page 42 - ... cooperation, the United States reiterates what it has specifically stated in Alliance consultations during the negotiations, that is, the noncircumvention provision will not affect existing patterns of collaboration and cooperation with its Allies, nor will it preclude cooperation in modernization. The United States believes that, in practice, the noncircumvention provision, which it will apply as stated below, will not interfere with continued nuclear and conventional cooperation with its Allies.
Page 5 - No arms limitation agreement can ever be absolutely verifiable. The relevant test is not an abstract ideal, but the practical standard of whether we can determine compliance adequately to safeguard our security — that is, whether we can identify attempted evasion if it occurs on a large enough scale to pose a significant risk, and whether we can do so in time to mount a sufficient response. Meeting this test is what I mean by the term "adequate verification.
Page 333 - L. GOSS— Resumed Mr. ASPINALL. Due to the fact that the gentleman from Oregon has to leave, I will yield to him. Mr. WYATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend all three of you gentlemen for your presentation and since I was in Oregon yesterday and was unable to attend the hearing yesterday I made no statement on this proposal, I would like to advise you that I heartily commend you for this project. I think perhaps as the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Udall, stated, this is...
Page 2 - US advantages in other characteristics; and the US posture Is not in fact, and is not seen as, inferior In performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.
Page 65 - Provide through the established system of radio broadcasts of information and warning to mariners, not less than 3 to 5 days in advance as a rule, notification of actions on the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight.