Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy
The doctrine of the two truths--a conventional truth and an ultimate truth--is central to Buddhist metaphysics and epistemology. The two truths (or two realities), the distinction between them, and the relation between them is understood variously in different Buddhist schools and is of special importance to the Madhyamaka school. The fundamental ideas are articulated with particular force by Nagarjuna (2nd--3rd century CE) who famously claims that the two truths are identical to one another, and yet distinct. One of the most influential interpretations of Nagarjuna's difficult doctrine derives from the commentary of Candrakirti (6th century CE). While much attention has been devoted to explaining the nature of the ultimate truth in view of its special soteriological role, less has been paid to understanding the nature of conventional truth, which is often described as "deceptive," "illusion," or "truth for fools." But conventional truth is nonetheless truth. This book therefore asks, "what is true about conventional truth?" and "What are the implications of an understanding of conventional truth for our lives?"
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Authority regarding Deceptive Reality
3 Pr257sangika Epistemology in Context
Models of the Conventional in Tsongkhapas Account of Madhyamaka
Why the dGag Bya Matters So Much to Tibetan M257dhyamikas
6 Can a M257dhyamika Be a Skeptic? The Case of Patsab Nyimadrak
7 Madhyamaka and Classical Greek Skepticism
8 The Two Truths about Truth
9 How Far Can a M257dhyamika Buddhist Reform Conventional Truth? Dismal Relativism Fictionalism EasyEasy Truth and the Alternatives
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Abhidharma accept analysis appear argues arguments āryas assert ba’i bden bodhisattva bodhisattva path buddha Buddhist Candrakīrti Carnap chapter claim conceptual construction context conventional cognition conventional epistemic conventional existence conventional reality conventional truth conventionally existent conventionally true cowherds dang deceptive dependent dgag Dharmakīrti Dignāga distinction dngos entities epistemic instruments epistemology established ethical fact false fictionalism fictionalist Garfield gnyis Gorampa grub gyur Hence intrinsic nature jig rten ma yin Madhyamaka Mādhyamikas Mahāyāna means mirage mthong Nāgārjuna notion numbers Nyāya nyid object of negation ontological pa’i pa’i phyir Patsab perception perspective phenomena philosophical position practices pramāṇa Prāsaṅgika precepts Pyrrhonian skepticism question rang bzhin rdzob reliable cognition rigs rnam sense Sextus Siderits skye snang sogs statements strategy svabhāva Svātantrika T-schema tha snyad theory things Tibetan Tillemans tion tional truthmakers tshad Tsongkhapa ultimate reality ultimate truth understanding upāya Yogācāra