Moral Theory and Medical PracticeMoral Theory and Medical Practice aims to bring the practical needs of medicine closer to the theoretical interests of philosophy. While most work in the field of medical ethics has been concerned with the examination and solution of practical dilemmas, this book explores the potential benefits of philosophical analysis. By drawing directly on moral theory, philosophical analysis can help to resolve difficulties in the practice of medicine and psychiatry that arise from the obscurity of our concepts of illness and disease. The author provides a specifically philosophical contribution to an improved clinical practice, in particular in showing a new way of understanding the clinically problematic concepts of psychosis and delusion. He examines both mental and physical illness as evaluative concepts, and argues convincingly that our notion of mental illness is indeed value laden (as in anti-psychiatric theories), and reconciles these two traditional extreme views within a general theory encompassing both. This book will appeal to students and scholars of philosophy, especially those concerned with medical ethics, medicine, law, politics, sociology, social work and nursing. |
Contents
The debate about mental illness | 3 |
ILLNESS AND DISEASE AS VALUE TERMS | 25 |
The conventional view | 27 |
Dysfunction | 35 |
Disease | 57 |
Illness | 72 |
ILLNESS AND DISEASE AS MEDICAL VALUE TERMS | 87 |
Dysfunction and function | 89 |
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS | 165 |
Diagnosis | 167 |
Treatment | 186 |
Primary Health Care | 244 |
CONCLUSIONS | 255 |
Overview and future developments | 257 |
Appendix | 284 |
Bibliography | 294 |
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Common terms and phrases
action failure alcoholism Aubrey Lewis biological functional objects bodily illness Boorse Boorse's brain cancer chapter classifications clinical practice compulsory treatment concept of illness concept of mental conventional view criteria debate about mental defined definition delusional delusions derived descriptivism descriptivist designed-for developed diagnosis disease concepts distinct DSM-III dysfunction elements empirical ethics-based view evaluative connotations example expressed by illness factitious disorder factual beliefs failure of ordinary feelings and sensations form of argument functioning properly grounds of compulsory Hence illness-diagnostic implied intentions kind of value least less logical medical concepts migraine moral non-descriptivist non-empirical normal ordinary usage particular kind patient phenomenology philosophical philosophy of action physical illness physical medicine problems properties psychological medicine psychotic mental illness purpose question raising my arm relationship respect reverse view reverse-view analysis schizophrenia scientific sense similar specification structure of medicine supervenient technical contexts things thought insertion value judgement value terms