Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political ScienceThis is the first comprehensive critical evaluation of the use of rational choice explanations in political science. Writing in an accessible and nontechnical style, Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro assess rational choice theory where it is reputed to be most successful: the study of collective action, the behavior of political parties and politicians, and such phenomena as voting cycles and Prisoner's Dilemmas. In their hard-hitting critique, Green and Shapiro demonstrate that the much-heralded achievements of rational choice theory are in fact deeply suspect and that fundamental rethinking is needed if rational choice theorists are to contribute to the understanding of politics. Green and Shapiro show that empirical tests of rational choice theories are marred by a series of methodological defects. These defects flow from the characteristic rational choice impulse to defend universal theories of politics. As a result, many tests are so poorly conducted as to be irrelevant to evaluating rational choice models. Tests that are properly conducted either tend to undermine rational choice theories or to lend support for propositions that are banal. Green and Shapiro offer numerous suggestions as to how rational choice propositions might be reformulated as parts of testable hypotheses for the study of politics. In a final chapter they anticipate and respond to a variety of rational choice counterarguments, thereby initiating a dialogue that is bound to continue for some time. |
Contents
RATIONALITY IN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS | 1 |
THE NATURE OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY | 13 |
METHODOLOGICAL PATHOLOGIES | 33 |
THE PARADOX OF VOTER TURNOUT | 47 |
SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND FREERIDING | 72 |
LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR AND THE PARADOX OF VOTING | 98 |
SPATIAL THEORIES OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION | 147 |
RESPONSES TO LIKELY COUNTERARGUMENTS | 179 |
| 205 | |
| 233 | |
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actors agenda alternative American Political Science analysis analytic argue argument assume assumptions ballot campaign candidates Chapter claim coalition collective action collective benefits committee contributions cooperative core costs decision economic effects election electoral competition empirical testing Enelow equilibrium evidence example expected utility experimental experiments explain fact Ferejohn Fiorina free-rider game theory Hinich ideal points ideological individual institutional issue Journal of Political legislative behavior logrolling majority rule maximize McKelvey and Ordeshook median voter methodological Nash equilibrium null hypothesis Olson outcomes participation party payoffs platforms players Plott political science Political Science Review polls post hoc predictions preferences Prisoner's Dilemma problem proposal propositions Public Choice question rational choice explanations rational choice models rational choice scholarship rational choice theory rational ignorance Riker and Ordeshook selective incentives Shepsle side-payments social dilemma solution concepts spatial models strategic stylized facts suggest theoretical theorists tion uncovered set voter turnout Weingast