Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab RegimesArab leaderships have been remarkably stable since the 1970s, particularly given the frequency of military coups in preceding years. Nonetheless, the military remains a key force in most Arab states and political leaders must maintain its loyalty if they are to retain office. Regimes have used a range of methods to ensure the military’s backing: Tribal relations underpin King Hussein’s political control in Jordan. Transjordanians have not only been the main beneficiaries of political power, but have also occupied the key positions in the armed forces. In this paper, Risa Brooks argues that the need for Arab regimes to maintain political control can undermine the combat potential of their armed forces. Centralising command, creating overlapping commands, politicising selection criteria and authorising involvement in economic activities all potentially compromise military effectiveness. |
Contents
1979 | |
1982 | |
Maintaining Power | 1986 |
Defence Expenditure in the Middle East and North Africa 1985 19961997 | 1991 |
Force Sizes in the Middle East and North Africa | 1997 |
Political Control and Military Capabilities | 1997 |
Leadership Succession | 1997 |
Egypt | 1997 |
Article 7 of the JordanIsrael Peace Treaty 26 October 1994 | 1994 |
Other editions - View all
Political-military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes Risa Brooks No preview available - 1998 |