Private Wealth and Public Revenue
Inequality and taxation are fundamental problems of modern times. How and when can democracies tax economic elites? This book develops a theoretical framework that refines and integrates the classic concepts of business's instrumental (political) power and structural (investment) power to explain the scope and fate of tax initiatives targeting economic elites in Latin America after economic liberalization. In Chile, business's multiple sources of instrumental power, including cohesion and ties to right parties, kept substantial tax increases off the agenda. In Argentina, weaker business power facilitated significant reform, although specific sectors, including finance and agriculture, occasionally had instrumental and/or structural power to defend their interests. In Bolivia, popular mobilization counterbalanced the power of economic elites, who were much stronger than in Argentina but weaker than in Chile. The book's in-depth, medium-N case analysis and close attention to policymaking processes contribute insights on business power and prospects for redistribution in unequal democracies.
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The Power of Economic Elites
Progress at the Margins
Weak Economic Elites and Direct Tax Policy Successes
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actors administration agenda agricultural Anti-Evasion Reform Argentina asserted benefits Bolivia business associations business power business’s CEPB Chapter Chile Chilean Clarín cohesion Concertación Congress context corporate tax increase crisis deposits direct tax direct tax increases economic elites Economy Ministry effective electoral equity appeals evasion export tax Eyzaguirre 2007 Finance Ministry financial sector fiscal government’s Hacker and Pierson hydrocarbons incentives initiatives instrumental power interview investment Lagos Latin America legislators lobbying March March 12 Mercurio mining minister Ministry-A Nación neoliberal nomic opposition outcomes partisan linkages party percent of GDP personal income tax policy areas policymakers popular mobilization popular sectors president producers profits progressive taxation proposal protest redistributive Sánchez de Lozada Santa Cruz Schneider Senate sources of instrumental sources of power Springer Science+Business Media structural power tax agency tax policy tax rate tax reform tax revenue taxation tion transactions tax votes weak wealth tax