Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social SituationsThis is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner. |
Contents
3 | 54 |
57 | 73 |
Some basic concepts of game theory | 87 |
Rationality postulates for game situations | 113 |
The four basic problems facing the players of a game | 124 |
7 | 128 |
the Nash solution | 141 |
General twoperson cooperative games | 167 |
nPerson simple bargaining games | 196 |
the modified | 212 |
the general case | 244 |
discriminatory solutions | 263 |
Noncooperative and almostnoncooperative games | 273 |
Conclusion | 289 |
| 305 | |
Other editions - View all
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations John C. Harsanyi No preview available - 1977 |
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations John C. Harsanyi No preview available - 1977 |
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations John C. Harsanyi No preview available - 1977 |
Common terms and phrases
A₁ A₂ agreement alternative assume assumption Axiom B₁ B₂ bargaining strategies best reply boundary H c₁ c₂ called cardinal utility centroid choice choose concession cooperative game corresponding decision maker defined dominance Equation equilibrium point example expected final payoff game G game situations game theory game tree game with transferable given player individual joint payoff joint strategy Lemma maximin payoff maximin strategy mixed strategies n-person cooperative game Nash solution node noncooperative game obtain outcome payoff space payoff ū payoff vector payoff-dominance payoffs u₁ player i's possible preferences pure strategies r₁ rational behavior rational expectations rational players rationality postulates risky prospects satisfy Shapley value simple bargaining game social situations social-welfare function solution concept strategy combination strategy n-tuples strategy pair subgame subjective probabilities Suppose Theorem threat strategies tion transferable utility ū₁ u₂ ultimatum game upper right boundary utility comparisons utility function variables yield Zeuthen's Principle