Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination

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Cambridge University Press, Aug 12, 1993 - Business & Economics - 430 pages
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In this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisatian policies in both a single- and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty, and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect for a policy-maker's reputation of sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle relationships between governments and conscious rational private sectors, and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject. This book will be of interest to students and teachers of open economy macroeconomics, and to professional economists interested in using macroeconomic models in policy design.
 

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Contents

Introduction
1
Part I General issues
19
Part II Theory and methodology
93
Part III Fiscal and monetary policy in interdependent economies
211
References
407
Index
420
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