The Principles of Representative GovernmentThe thesis of this original and provocative book is that representative government should be understood as a combination of democratic and undemocratic, aristocratic elements. Professor Manin challenges the conventional view that representative democracy is no more than an indirect form of government by the people, in which citizens elect representatives only because they cannot assemble and govern in person. The argument is developed by examining the historical moments when the present institutional arrangements were chosen from among the then available alternatives. Professor Manin reminds us that while today representative institutions and democracy appear as virtually indistinguishable, when representative government was first established in Europe and America, it was designed in opposition to democracy proper. Drawing on the procedures used in earlier republican systems, from classical Athens to Renaissance Florence, in order to highlight the alternatives that were forsaken, Manin brings to the fore the generally overlooked results of representative mechanisms. These include the elitist aspect of elections and the non-binding character of campaign promises. |
Contents
| 8 | |
| 42 | |
| 44 | |
| 67 | |
| 79 | |
| 94 | |
| 95 | |
| 98 | |
The verdict of the people | 161 |
Partial independence of representatives | 163 |
Freedom of public opinion | 167 |
The repeated character of elections | 175 |
Trial by discussion | 183 |
Metamorphoses of representative government | 193 |
Parliamentarianism | 202 |
Party democracy | 206 |
| 102 | |
A democratic aristocracy | 132 |
a pure theory | 134 |
the benefits of ambiguity | 149 |
Election and the principles of modern natural right | 156 |
Audience democracy | 218 |
Conclusion | 236 |
Index | 239 |
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Common terms and phrases
Anti-Federalists argument aristocratic Aristotle Assembly Athenian Democracy Athens candidates Carl Schmitt centuriate assemblies characteristics choice choose citizens classes cleavages concept consent constitution Corporatism Council courts culture debate decide decisions democratic dimension discussion distinction effect egalitarian electoral districts elites equality equality of outcome established expression fact favor Federalist Florentine founders of representative Freedom of public functions Guicciardini Hansen Harrington Ibid individuals institutions Madison magistracies magistrates majority Melancton Smith ment modern Montesquieu natural aristocracy nature of election objective oligarchic Parliament parliamentarianism particular party democracy person polls popular position possible prerogative century principle procedure property qualification proposed public opinion reason reflected regarded representative democracy representative government republic republican result role rotation Rousseau rule rulers Schmitt Schumpeter selection by lot sense Siéyès social Social Contract speech suffrage superior term tion tive traits Treatise of Government University Press vote voters wealth
Popular passages
Page 84 - I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he; and therefore truly, sir, I think it's clear, that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government...
Page 116 - The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society...
Page 186 - If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination...
Page 117 - The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least ikely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.
Page 186 - Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests ; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates ; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole ; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.
Page 122 - ... in the small republic, it follows that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
Page 162 - And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.
Page 115 - Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor ; not the learned, more than the ignorant ; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune.
Page 221 - ... to the discretion of him that has the executive power. For the legislators not being able to foresee and provide by laws for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common law of Nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society...
Page 115 - Who are to be the objects of popular choice ? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the People.