The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the AuthorA series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one’s own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages. |
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Enforcement Communication and Strategic | 119 |
Game Theory and Experimental Research | 162 |
Randomization of Promises and Threats | 175 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage agree agreement alternative assume attack bargaining become behavior better carry chance choice choose Column commitment communication concert consider cooperative coordination cost course decision depends deterrence effect enemy enforcement evidence example expectations fact final forces gain game theory give given identify important incentive initial interest involved keep kind knows least leave less limited mathematical matrix matter means meet move mutual negotiation nuclear objective offer one's original other's outcome particular party payoffs perhaps person play players position possible potential preference present principle probability problem promise pure question random rational reach reason recognize reduce requires retaliation risk role rules Russians seems sense side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise symmetry tacit tactic theory third threat threaten tion weapons yield