Truth and Objectivity

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Harvard University Press, 1994 - Philosophy - 247 pages
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Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgments, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers interested in realism, including the "deflationary" conception of truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation, and the role of moral states of affairs in explanations of moral beliefs.

 

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Contents

Inflating Deflationist
1
Minimal Truth Internal Realism and Superassertibility
33
Convergence and Cognitive Command
71
The Euthyphro Contrast
108
Cognitive Command and the Theoreticity of Observation
140
Realism and the Best Explanation of Belief
174
Quietism
202
Minimalism about Meaning
231
39
239
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About the author (1994)

Crispin Wright is Leverhulme Research Professor and Bishop Wardlaw Professor at the University of St. Andrews and is Global Distinguished Professor at New York University.

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