Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage
Peter A. Hall, David Soskice
OUP Oxford, Aug 30, 2001 - Business & Economics - 556 pages
What are the most fundamental differences among the political economies of the developed world? How do national institutional differences condition economic performance, public policy, and social well-being? Will they survive the pressures for convergence generated by globalization and technological change? These have long been central questions in comparative political economy. This book provides a new and coherent set of answers to them. Building on the new economics of organization, the authors develop an important new theory about which differences among national political economies are most significant for economic policy and performance. Drawing on a distinction between 'liberal' and 'coordinated' market economies, they argue that there is more than one path to economic success. Nations need not converge to a single Anglo-American model. They develop a new theory of 'comparative institutionaladvantage' that transforms our understanding of international trade, offers new explanations for the response of firms and nations to the challenges of globalization, and provides a new theory of national interest to explain the conduct of nations in international relations. The analysis brings the firm back into the centre of comparative political economy. It provides new perspectives on economic and social policy-making that illuminate the role of business in the development of the welfare state and the dilemmas facing those who make economic policy in the contemporary world. Emphasizing the 'institutional complementarities' that link labour relations, corporate finance, and national legal systems, the authors bring interdisciplinary perspectives to bear on issues of strategic management, economic performance, and institutional change. This pathbreaking work sets new agendas in the study of comparative political economy. As such, it will be of value to academics and graduate students in economics, business, and political science, as well as to many others with interests in international relations, social policy-making, and the law.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies
Institutional and Sectoral Interactions in Monetary Policy
When Why and How Does
Business Government and Patterns of Labor Market
Cooperation in Germany and France
Other editions - View all
activities actors advantages allowed approach areas associations attempt banks bargaining become benefits Britain British capacity capital cent central chapter collective companies comparative competitive cooperation coordination corporate costs countries courts create demand depend early effects employers employment European example existing face forms framework France French German groups highly important incentives increase independence industry inflation innovation institutional interaction interest invest issues Italy labor market large firms less liberal lower market economies measures ment monetary organization outcome particular political economy position practices preferences problems production protection rates redistribution reform regimes regulation relations relationship relatively require result risk role sector share skills social policy specific standards strategies strong structure suggests suppliers tion trade types unions United University varieties wage workers
Page xiv - ELLWOOD is professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Page viii - I also gratefully acknowledge support through a grant from the Research and Writing Initiative of the Program on Global Security and Sustainability of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Page 9 - North (1990: 3), we define institutions as a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons, and organizations as durable entities with formally recognized members, whose rules also contribute to the institutions of the political...