Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative AdvantagePeter A. Hall, David Soskice What are the most fundamental differences among the political economies of the developed world? How do national institutional differences condition economic performance, public policy, and social well-being? Will they survive the pressures for convergence generated by globalization and technological change? These have long been central questions in comparative political economy. This book provides a new and coherent set of answers to them. Building on the new economics of organization, the authors develop an important new theory about which differences among national political economies are most significant for economic policy and performance. Drawing on a distinction between 'liberal' and 'coordinated' market economies, they argue that there is more than one path to economic success. Nations need not converge to a single Anglo-American model. They develop a new theory of 'comparative institutionaladvantage' that transforms our understanding of international trade, offers new explanations for the response of firms and nations to the challenges of globalization, and provides a new theory of national interest to explain the conduct of nations in international relations. The analysis brings the firm back into the centre of comparative political economy. It provides new perspectives on economic and social policy-making that illuminate the role of business in the development of the welfare state and the dilemmas facing those who make economic policy in the contemporary world. Emphasizing the 'institutional complementarities' that link labour relations, corporate finance, and national legal systems, the authors bring interdisciplinary perspectives to bear on issues of strategic management, economic performance, and institutional change. This pathbreaking work sets new agendas in the study of comparative political economy. As such, it will be of value to academics and graduate students in economics, business, and political science, as well as to many others with interests in international relations, social policy-making, and the law. |
Contents
| 1 | |
Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies | 71 |
Institutional and Sectoral Interactions in Monetary Policy | 104 |
When Why and How Does | 184 |
Varieties | 213 |
Business Government and Patterns of Labor Market | 247 |
Employers Public Policy and the Politics of Decentralized | 275 |
Coordination and Restructuring | 307 |
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Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage Peter A. Hall,David Soskice No preview available - 2001 |
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actors advantage Air France approach associations banks bargaining benefits Britain British British Airways Cambridge capacity central central-bank independence CMEs company strategies comparative competitive contract law cooperation coordinated market economies corporate governance Corporatism costs countries courts create decentralized deregulation effects employers employment protection European French German globalization high-skill important incentives increase industrial relations industry frameworks inflation innovation institutional frameworks inter-firm interaction invest Japan labor market large firms legal transplants liberal market economies LMEs Lufthansa Maastricht Maastricht Treaty ment monetary negotiations networks non-market OECD organization outcome Oxford political economy preferences problems product market strategies production regimes reform regulation regulatory relationships risk redistribution role Saxony-Anhalt sector social policy social policy space Soskice specific skills standards Streeck structure suppliers tion top management trade unions University Press varieties of capitalism wage wage/price-bargaining welfare workers
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Page xiv - ELLWOOD is professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Page 5 - For this purpose, we construe the key relationships in the political economy in game-theoretic terms and focus on the kinds of institutions that alter the outcomes of strategic interaction.
Page viii - I also gratefully acknowledge support through a grant from the Research and Writing Initiative of the Program on Global Security and Sustainability of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Page 9 - North (1990: 3), we define institutions as a set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material reasons, and organizations as durable entities with formally recognized members, whose rules also contribute to the institutions of the political...