Warlord Politics and African StatesReno (political science, Florida International U.) examines alternative, usually clandestine, economic systems, arguing that such phenomena as tax evasion, illicit production, smuggling, and protection rackets have become widespread and integral to building political authority in parts of Africa. He also clarifies the limitations of the liberalizing reforms of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by detailing how weak- state and warlord political economies restrict and manipulate bank and IMF prescriptions. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
The Distinctive Political Logic of Weak States | 15 |
Africas Weakest States After the Cold War | 45 |
The Organization of Warlord Politics in Liberia | 79 |
Sierra Leones Transition to Warlord Politics | 113 |
Sovereignty and the Fragmentation of | 147 |
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Common terms and phrases
Abacha Africa alliances appeared arms army arrangements associates attract authority benefits building bureaucracies capacity capital Central civil clandestine Cold collapse commercial companies continue corruption create creditors critical deal Development diamond Doe's economic efforts elite enterprising ethnic example Executive Outcomes external faced factions finance forces foreign firms formal former global groups important included independent institutions interests internal Journal June Leone's Liberia manage manipulate March markets military million mining Mobutu networks Nigeria NPFL officials operations opportunities organizations outsiders patronage percent policies politicians president production profit protect rebels reform regime regional relations Report Rights rivals role rule rulers shows Sierra Leone social society sources South African sovereign sovereignty strategy strong strongmen struggle Studies Taylor threat tion trade units University Press warlord politics Washington weak World Bank York Zaire