Measurement in Psychology: A Critical History of a Methodological ConceptThis book traces how such a seemingly immutable idea as measurement proved so malleable when it collided with the subject matter of psychology. It locates philosophical and social influences (such as scientism, practicalism and Pythagoreanism) reshaping the concept and, at the core of this reshaping, identifies a fundamental problem: the issue of whether psychological attributes really are quantitative. It argues that the idea of measurement now endorsed within psychology actually subverts attempts to establish a genuinely quantitative science and it urges a new direction. It relates views on measurement by thinkers such as Holder, Russell, Campbell and Nagel to earlier views, like those of Euclid and Oresme. Within the history of psychology, it considers contributions by Fechner, Cattell, Thorndike, Stevens and Suppes, among others. It also contains a non-technical exposition of conjoint measurement theory and recent foundational work by leading measurement theorist R. Duncan Luce. |
Contents
CHAPTER 1 Numerical data and the meaning of measurement | 1 |
CHAPTER 2 Quantitative psychologys intellectual inheritance | 24 |
CHAPTER 3 Quantity number and measurement in science | 46 |
CHAPTER 4 Early psychology and the quantity objection | 78 |
CHAPTER 5 Making the representational theory of measurement | 109 |
CHAPTER 6 The status of psychophysical measurement | 140 |
Common terms and phrases
additive relation additive structure aggregate applied attri attributes are quantitative axioms Campbell Campbell's causal chology classical concept concatenation concept of measurement continuous quantity defined definition of measurement derived measurement Descartes E. G. Boring empirical relations entail equal Euclid’s example existence experimental fact Fechner Hölder hypothesis identified intensive quantities involved item response theory kind length logic logically independent Luce mathematical measurement theory ment mental tests methods Nagel natural numbers non-quantitative numerical assignments numerical representation observed scores operationism operations ordinal philosophical Philosophy of Mathematics positive real numbers properties psychol psychological attributes psychological measurement Pythagoreanism quantitative attributes quantitative psychology quantitative science quantity objection QUENTIN SKINNER ratio scale ratios of magnitudes recognised relation of additivity relative relevant representational theory representationalism Russell Russell’s S. S. Stevens scientific task scientists sensation intensities sense sense-distances specific Stevens stimulus Suppes theoretical theory of measurement thesis things thought understanding of measurement unit