after the fall of Charles the Firft; and, though the greatest efforts had been made to establish another form of government in its stead, yet, no fooner was Charles the Second called over, than the conftitution was re-established upon all its ancient foundations."

The state of compulfive force, ufurpation, or tyranny, is a temporary fubversion of the government, as a tempeftuous commotion. of the fea is a temporary derangement or violation of the natural laws of fpecific gravity, by which the cork would for ever re

tyranny.

main afloat upon the water. *«As ufur- Difference of pation," fays Mr. Locke," is the exercife of ufurpation and power, which another hath a right to, fo tyranny is the exercife of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to." And he fays elsewhere, †"No polities can be founded on any thing, but the consent of the people."

Before I enter immediately upon the particular nature of our conftitution, it will not be improper to fubmit to my readers what this folid and perfpicuous philofopher says of the general forms of a common-wealth."The majority having, as has been shew

Locke of Civil Government, c. xviii. ↑ 1bid. c. xvi.

Ibid. c. xvi.

L 2

ed,

government.

Varions forts of ed, upon man's firft uniting into fociety, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing thofe laws by officers of their own appointing, and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy; or elfe, may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few felect men, and their heirs or fucceffors, and then it is an oligarchy; or elfe into the hands of one man, and then · it is a monarchy; if to him and his heirs, it is an bereditary monarchy; if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a fucceffor to return to them, an elective monarchy: and fo accordingly of thefe the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more perfons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the fupreme power to revert to them again; when it is fo reverted, the community may difpose of it again anew, into what hands they pleafe, and fo conftitute a new form of government. For the form of government depending upon. the placing the fupreme power, which is the legislative, it being impoffible to conceive,

that

that an inferior power should prescribe to a fuperior, or any, but the fupreme, make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, fuch is the form of the commonwealth."

power.

The fupremacy, or fovereignty of all po- Legislative litical power, is the legislative power in a ftate; and the first and fundamental pofitive law of all commonwealths, is the establishing of the legislative power. This, in fact, is the act of the community's vesting their own right or power in their delegates or trustees: and the English community had certainly the fame. right, as every other community, upon uniting in fociety, to make this delegation, or create this truft in whatever manner they chofe; in other words, they were perfectly free to adopt a democratical, an aristocratical, or an hereditary, or an elective monarchical form of government. This was, as I have before proved, a freedom given by God to each community; fingule fpecies regiminis funt de jure gentium; but the choice being once made, or these delegates and trustees having - been once nominated and appointed, the submiffion of the people to them is jure divino. "This legislative is not only the fupreme

power of the commonwealth, but facred and unalterable in the hands, where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body elfe, in what form foever conceived, or by what power foever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its fanction from that legislative, which the public has chofen and appointed; and fo, in a constituted commonwealth, there can be but one fupreme power, which is the legiflative, to which all the reft are and must be fubordinate."

This nation or community, have for many centuries chofen, and the majority, at this hour continue to chufe a form of government partaking of the democratical, ariftocratical, and monarchical; for *" these three species of government have all of them their several perfections and imperfections: democracies are ufually the best calculated to direct the end of a law; ariftocracies to invent the means, by which that end fhall be obtained; and monarchies to carry thofe means into execution; and the ancients, as was obferved, had, in general, no idea of any other permanent form of government, but these three; for though Cicero †

• Blakist. Introd. to his Comm. p. 50, in the quarto edition.

In his Fragments de Rep. c. ii.

declares

declares himself of opinion, " esse optimè conflitutam rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo, et populari fit modicè confufa" yet Tacitus treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a vifionary whim, and one, that if effected could never be lafting or fecure *.

our own.

"But, happily for us of this ifland, the Exemplified in British conftitution has long remained, and I trust will long continue, a standing exception to the truth of this obfervation. For, as with us the executive power of the laws is lodged in a fingle perfon, they have all the advantages of ftrength and dispatch, that are to be found in the most abfolute monarchy; and, as the legislature of the kingdom is entrufted to three diftinct powers entirely independent of each other; first, the king; fecondly, the lords fpiritual and temporal, which is an aristocratical affembly of perfons felected for their piety, their birth, their wifdom, their valour, or their property; and, thirdly, the house of commons, freely chofen by the people, from among themselves, which

• Cunetas nationes et urbes, populus, aut primores, aut finguli regunt: delecta ex his et conftituta reipub. licæ forma laudari faciliùs, quam evenire; vel, fi evenit baud diuturna effe poteft. Ann. 1. 4.