mere creatures of the imagination, attributable only to man in this ideal state of speculation: they bear the fame fort of analogy to the physical state of man in fociety, as principles and properties of mathematical points and lines bear to the practical rules of mechanics. As well might we attempt to handle and manufacture a mathematical point, as to move only upon the principles of this state of nature, being placed by the beneficence of our Creator in the physical state of society. Some of our greatest philofophers, as is often the cafe, to avoid pleonasm, and in the full glare of their own conviction, have omitted to fay, in exprefs words, that this ftate of nature, in which they confidered man in the abstract, never had an actual, physical, or real existence in this world; and this omiffion has, perhaps, occafioned the error of many modern illuminators, who, from igno rance, have confounded the two ftates together, or, from defigned malice, have tranfplanted the attributes and properties of the one into the other.

To ftate the opinions of these philofophers upon the Rights of Man, in this ftate of nature, is to demonstrate, that they confidered it as pre-existing and antecedent to the phyfical state of man's real existence. C "To

From the phy

fical formation

«To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must confider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a ftate of perfect freedom to order their actions, and difpofe of their poffeffions and perfons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man; a ftate alfo of equality, wherein all the power and jurifdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the fame fpecies and rank, promifcuously born to all the fame advantages of nature, and the use of the fame faculties, fhould be equal one amongst another, without fubordination or subjection."

"Prior to all those laws are thofe of nature, fo called, because they derive their force entirely from our frame and being. In order to have a perfect knowledge of these laws, we muft confider man before the establishment of fociety: the laws received in fuch a state would be thofe of nature.".

It requires no argument to prove, when of Adam and the phyfical civilized ftate of fociety com

Eve the state of

pure nature was

phyfically im. poilible.

this must be dated the impoffible existence of the ftate of pure nature. Mr. Locke establishes this commencement from the formation and co-existence of our first parents, Adam and Eve; and he draws the neceffity of it from the intrinfic nature and exigencies of man, as he has been actually formed and constituted by his Creator.

"God having

made man fuch a creature, that, in his own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under ftrong obligations of neceffity, convenience, and inclination, to drive him into fociety, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The firft fociety was between man and wife; which gave beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, that between mafter and fervant came to be added." This fact then is uncontrovertible, that the only individual, who can be said, in any fenfe, to have existed in the state of nature, was Adam, before the formation of his wife. But how these rights could be exercised by him in that forlorn ftate of folitude, I know as little, as I do of the period of its duration. When, therefore, we fpeak generally of the Rights of Man, we ought to be understood to

• Locke of Civil Government, c. vii. p. 188.

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speak

framed by God Man phyfically for fociety.

fpeak of those rights, which are attributable to The exercife of man in the civilized state of fociety. Thus every

rights imports

the neceffity of difcuffion of the actual exercife of the Rights fociety.

*

of Man imports neceffarily the contemplation of the focial civil man, and no other. And accordingly, Mr. Payne, having derided the futile and inept attempt to deduce the Rights of Man from any given period of antiquity, fays, "The fact is, that portions of antiquity, by proving every thing, establish nothing. It is authority against authority all the way, till we come to the divine origin of the Rights of Man at the creation. Here our enquiries find a refting place, and our reafon finds a home. If a difpute about the Rights of Man had arofe at the distance of an hundred years from the creation, it is to this fource of authority they must have referred, and it is to the fame fource of authority, that we must now refer."

Having thus diftinctly marked the line of difference between the state of nature and the ftate of civil fociety, I fhall proceed to state fully and clearly what rights are attributable to, or inherent in man in this ftate of nature, When writers talk of the tranfition of man

from one of these states to the other, they do not mean to allude to any given time or occafion, in which mankind actually paffed from the one to the other; but they do it by way of methodizing their ideas upon the subject; as philofophers, in difcuffing the nature of man, or any other created being, first consider the existence, before they enter upon the peculiar properties or attributes of the existing being, upon this axiom, that prius eft effe, quam effe talis; although it be known to every one, that the phyfical existence and fpecific modification of every created being are in reality fimultaneous, In the like manner do they mention, in this fuppofed transition, the retention of fome of their rights, and the furrender of others, *« From this short review, it will be eafy to diftinguish between that clafs of natural rights, which man retains after entering into fociety, and thofe, which he throws into common stock, as a member of fociety. Of the distinction of thefe two forts of rights I fhall hereafter have occafion to take notice."

In this theoretic ftate of pure nature, the moft perfect equality of mankind must neceffarily exift; because it represents man in a general

abstract point of view, that effentially pre

Payne's Rights of Man, p. 49.
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cludes

Men viewed in

the abstract as

equal, are to be

fentially in the

confidered ef

ftate of nature.