There can be no controul power. the fundamentals of government, they are cafes, which the law will not out of decency fuppofe; being incapable of diftrufting those, whom it has invefted with any part of the fupreme power; fince fuch diftrust would render the exercise of that power precarious and impracticable. For, wherever the law expreffes its diftrust of abufe of power, it always vefts a fuperior coercive authority in fome other hand to correct it; the very notion of which destroys the idea of fovereignty. If thereover fovereign fore for example, the two houses of parliament, or either of them, had avowedly a right to animadvert on the king, or each other, or if the king had a right to animadvert on either of the houses, that branch of the legislature fo fubject to animadverfion would inftantly ceafe to be part of the fupreme power; the balance of the conftitution would be overturned, and that branch or branches, in which this jurifdiction refided, would be completely fovereign. The fuppofition of law therefore is, that neither the king nor either house of parliament (collectively taken) is capable of doing any wrong; fince in fuch cafes the law feels itself incapable of furnishing any adequate remedy; for which reafon all oppreffion, which may happen to fpring from any branch of the fove reign power, muft neceffarily be out of the reach of any stated rule or express legal provifion; but if ever they unfortunately happen, the prudence of the times must provide new remedies upon new emergencies." Mr. Yorke, in his treatise upon the law of forfeiture, has in a very compendious and clear method enumerated most of the attributes, which the conftitution annexes to the political capacity of the king.« The king is confidered in law in two different capacities, the political and the natural. In his politic capacity he never dies, nor is fubject to infancy; is under the happy inability of doing wrong, because acting by his officers, and limited by law; combines characters and powers of fuch a kind, as to make him one of the three eftates in the conftitution; and forms that estate, which gives life and motion to the reft. He represents the kingdom in tranfacting with foreign countries for the purposes of peace or war. He has a controul in the making of laws, and when made, without his administration of them, they are a dead letter. He is the fountain of bonour, juftice, and mercy. The executive * Confiderations on the Law of Forfeiture, p. 113, 114. power of the government is lodged intirely in his hands; and for this reafon offences are referred to him, as being in contempt of that power, and to be punished by it. Treasons, which concern the representation of his authority, or the instruments, that convey it to the people, as his feals, his coin, and certain great magiftrates in the execution of their office, relate to the allegiance, which the fubject owes him in this view. In like manner treasons, which concern the fafety of the kingdom, in refpect of foreign invafion, or open rebellion, or fecret confpiracy; in a word, all crimes of a public nature, and even injuries to private persons, are supposed to be against his peace, dignity, and crown; fo that, what in other free countries are called laws relative to public crimes, or crimes against the state, pass in England under the general denomination of placita corone, or crown law." And he further very emphatically puts thefe queftions: *<< Has the law provided no remedy in respect of the king? And is the political capacity thus to furnish an exemption to him in his natural, from being called to account? The law will make no answer, but history will give one." • Confiderations on the Law of Forfeiture, p. 121. He He then enters into a detail of the revolution of 1688, which, as I have already faid fo much upon that fubject, I fhall not repeat. We never can fufficiently admire the delicate though powerful checks, with which the appear conftitution has enabled the other branches of De Lolme's Conflitution of England, b. i. c. vi. Conftitutional the prerogative. checks upon The cautious moderation rights of the dif ferent conftitu ent parts of our legiflature are exercised. the water, and leave it aground, and alfo fet it afloat again by granting fubfidies." The withholding or refufal of the neceffary with which the fupplies would be a measure of such extreme. violence, that would in effect produce a diffolution of the government; but such a natural and powerful bias has each constituent part of our conftitution for preferving its refpective equilibrium in the ftate, that the largest and most powerful prerogatives are ever exercised with the moft cautious moderation and prudence. Thus has parliament" in this respect impofed laws upon themselves, and without touching the prero-. gative itself they have moderated the exercise Civil lift grant of it. A cuftom has for a long time prevailed, at the beginning of every reign, and in the kind of overflowing of affection, which takes place between a king and his first parliament, to grant the king a revenue for his life a provifion, which with refpect to the great exertions of his power, does not abridge the influence of the commons, but yet puts him in a condition to fupport the dignity of the crown, and affords him, who is the first magiftrate of the nation, that independence, which the laws enfure alfo to those magi ed to the king for life. * De Lolme's Conftitution of England, b. i. c. vii. ftrates, |