the most horrid of all acts: but consider it, as it was willed and ordered of God, in the extent of his designs and views, it was the most admirable and glorious of all events; and God willing the event was the most holy volition of God, that ever was made known to men; and God's act in ordering it, was a divine act, which, above all others, manifests the moral excellency of the Divine Being.

Be

The consideration of these things may help us to a sufficient answer to the cavils of Arminians concerning what has been supposed by many Calvinists, of a distinction between a secret and revealed Will of God, and their diversity one from the other; supposing that the Calvinists herein ascribe inconsistent Wills to the Most High: which is without any foundation. God's secret and revealed Will, or, in other words, his disposing and preceptive Will may be diverse, and exercised in dissimilar acts, the one in disapproving and opposing, the other in willing and determining, without any inconsistence. cause, although these dissimilar exercises of the Divine Will may, in some respects, relate to the same things, yet, in strictness, they have different and contrary objects, the one evil and the other good. Thus, for instance, the crucifixion of Christ was a thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive Will of God; because, as it was viewed and done by his malignant murdercrs, it was a thing infinitely contrary to the holy nature of God, and so necessarily contrary to the holy inclination of his heart revealed in his law. Yet this does not at all hinder but that the crucifixion of Christ, considered with all those glorious consequences which were within the view of the Divine Omniscience, might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious event; and consequently be agreeable to his Will, though this Will may be secret, i. e. not revealed in God's law. And thus considered, the crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good. If the secret exercises of God's Will were of a kind that is dissimilar, and contrary to his revealed Will, respecting the same, or like objects; if the objects of both were good, or both evil; then, indeed, to ascribe contrary kinds of volition or inclination to God, respecting these objects, would be to ascribe an inconsistent Will to God: but to ascribe to Him different and opposite exercises of heart, respecting different objects, and objects contrary one to another, is so far from supposing God's Will to be inconsistent with itself, that it cannot be supposed consistent with itself any other way. For any Being to have a Will of choice respecting good, and, at the same time, a Will of rejection and refusal respecting evil, is to be very consistent: but the contrary, viz. to have the same Will towards these contrary objects, and to choose and love both good and evil at the same time, is to be very in

consistent.

There is no inconsistence in supposing that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his Will it should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe there is no person of good understanding who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world. And if so, it will certainly follow, that an infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is best, must choose that there should be such a thing. And if so, then such a choice is not an evil, but a wise and holy choice. And if so, then that providence which is agreeable to such a choice, is a wise and holy providence. Men do will sin as sin, and so are the authors and actors of it: they love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of any thing evil; though it be his pleasure so to

* Here are worthy to be observed some passages of a late noted writer of our nation, that nobody who is acquainted with him will suspect to be very favourable to Calvinism. "It is difficult," says he, "to handle the necessity of evil in such a manner as not to stumble on such as are not above being alarmed at propositions which have an uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the matter, they will find that consistently with the unlimited power of the supreme cause, it may be said, that in the best ordered system evils must have place."-Turnbull's PRINCIPLES of moral Philosophy, (p. 327, 328.) He is there speaking of moral evils, as may be seen.

Again the same author, in his second Vol. entitled Christian Philosophy, p. 35, has these words: "If the author and governor of all things be infinitely perfect, then whatever is, is right; of all possible systems he hath chosen the best: and, consequently, there is no absolute evil in the universe.-This being the case, all the seeming imperfections or evils in it are such only in a partial view; and with respect to the whole system, they are goods.

Ibid. p. 37. "Whence then comes evil? is the question that hath, in all ages, been reckoned the Gordian knot in philosophy. And indeed, if we own the existence of evil in the world in an absolute sense, we diametrically contradict what hath been just now proved of God. For if there be any evil in the system, that is not good with respect to the whole, then is the whole not good, but evil; or, at best, very imperfect: and an author must be as his workmanship is; as is the effect, such is the cause. But the solution of this difficulty is at hand; That there is no evil in the universe. What! Are there no pains, no imperfections?Is there no misery, no vice in the world? or are not these evils? Evils indeed they are: that is, those of one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally hurtful and abominable: but they are not evil or mischievous with respect to the whole.

Ibid. p. 42. "But he is, at the same time, said to create evil, darkness, confusion; and yet to do no evil, but to be the author of good only. He is called the "Father of lights," the author of "every perfect and good gift, with whom there is no variableness nor shadow of turning," who "tempteth no man," but "giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not." And yet by the prophet (Isa. xlv. 7.) he is introduced saying of himself, "I form light and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord, do all these things." What is the meaning, the plain language of all this, but that the Lord delighteth in goodness, and (as the scripture speaks) evil is "his strange work?" He intends and pursues the universal good of his creation: and the evil which happens is not permitted for its own sake, or through any pleasure in evil, but because it is requisite to the greater good pursued."

order things that, he permitting, sin will come to pass; for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence. His willing to order things so that evil should come to pass for the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not hate evil as evil and if so, then it is no reason why he may not reasonably forbid evil as evil, and punish it as such.

The Arminians themselves must be obliged, whether they will or no, to allow a distinction of God's Will, amounting to just the same thing that Calvinists intend by their distinction of a secret and revealed Will. They must allow a distinction of those things which God thinks best should be, considering all circumstances and consequences, and so are agreeable to his disposing Will, and those things which he loves, and are agreeable to his nature, in themselves considered. Who is there that will dare to say that the hellish pride, malice and cruelty of devils are agreeable to God, and what he likes and approves? And yet, I trust, there is no Christian divine but will allow, that it is agreeable to God's Will so to order and dispose things concerning them, so to leave them to themselves, and give them up to their own wickedness, that this perfect wickedness should be a necessary consequence. Doctor WHITBY's words plainly suppose and allow it. These following things may be laid down as maxims of plain truth and indisputable evidence.

1. That God is a perfectly happy Being, in the most absolute and highest sense possible.

2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from every thing that is contrary to happiness; and so, that in strict propriety of speech, there is no such thing as any pain, grief, or trouble in God.

3. When any intelligent being is really crossed and disappointed, and things are contrary to what he truly desires, he is the less pleased, or has less pleasure, his pleasure and happiness are diminished, and he suffers what is disagreeable to him, or is the subject of something that is of a nature contrary to joy and happiness, even pain and grief.t

From this last axiom, it follows, that if no distinction is to be admitted between God's hatred of sin, and his Will with respect to the event and the existence of sin, as the all-wise Determiner of all events, under the view of all consequences through the whole compass and series of things; I say, then

*Whitby on the Five Points, Edit. 2. 300, 305, 309.

† Certainly it is not less absurd and unreasonable to talk of God's Will and Desires being truly and properly crossed, without his suffering any uneasiness, or any thing grievous or disagreeable, than it is talk of something that may be called a revealed Will, which may, in some respect, be different from a secret purpose, which purpose may be fulfilled, when the other is opposed.

it certainly follows, that the coming to pass of every individual act of sin is truly, all things considered, contrary to his Will, and that his Will is really crossed in it; and this in proportion as He hates it. And as God's hatred of sin is infinite, by reason of the infinite contrariety of his Holy Nature to sin; so his Will is infinitely crossed in every act of sin that happens. Which is as much as to say, He endures that which is infinitely disagreeable to him, by means of every act of sin that He sees committed. And, therefore, as appears by the preceding positions, He endures truly and really infinite grief or pain from every sin. And so He must be infinitely crossed, and suffer infinite pain, every day, in millions of millions of instances: He must continually be the subject of an immense number of real, and truly infinitely great crosses and vexations. Which would be to make him infinitely the most miserable of all Beings.

If any objector should say; all that these things amount to, is, that God may do evil that good may come; which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in men ; and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. I answer, that for God to dispose and permit evil in the manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good may come; for it is not to do evil at all.-In order to a thing being morally evil, there must be one of these things belonging to it, either it must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own nature; or it must have a bad tendency; or it must proceed from an evil disposition, and be done for an evil end. But neither of these things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting such events as the immoral acts of creatures for good ends. (1.) It is not unfit in its own nature, that He should do so. it is in its own nature fit, that infinite wisdom, and not blind chance, should dispose moral good and evil in the world. And it is fit, that the Being who has infinite wisdom, and is the Maker, Owner, and Supreme Governor of the World, should take care of that matter. And, therefore, there is no unfitness, or unsuitableness in his doing it. It may be unfit, and so immoral, for any other beings to go about to order this affair; because they are not possessed of a wisdom that in any manner fits them for it; and, in other respects, they are not fit to be trusted with this affair; nor does it belong to them, they not being the owners and lords of the universe.

For

We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good man knew with absolute certainty it would be best, all things considered, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world, it would not be contrary to his wisdom and goodness for him to choose that it should be so. It is no evil desire to desire good, and to desire that which, all things considered, is best. And it is no unwise choice to choose that

that should be, which it is best should be; and to choose the existence of that thing concerning which this is known, viz. that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be chosen. On the contrary, it would be a plain defect in wisdom and goodness, for him not to choose it. And the reason why he might not order it, if he were able, would not be because he might not desire it, but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to him. But it is no harm for Him who is, by right, and in the greatest propriety, the Supreme Orderer of all things, to order every thing in such a manner, as it would be a point of wisdom in Him to choose that they should be ordered. If it would be a plain defect of wisdom and goodness in a being, not to choose that that should be, which He certainly knows it would, all things considered, be best should be (as was but now observed) then it must be impossible for a Being who has no defect of wisdom and goodness, to do otherwise than choose it should be; and that for this very reason, because He is perfectly wise and good. And if it be agreeable to perfect wisdom and goodness for him to choose that it should be, and the ordering of all things supremely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite wisdom and goodness to order that it should be. If the choice is good, the ordering and disposing things according to that choice must also be good. It can be no harm in one to whom it belongs "to do his Will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth," to execute a good volition. If this Will be good, and the object of his Will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing or willing it is not willing evil that good may come. And if so, then his ordering accordingly to that Will, is not doing evil, that good may come.

2. It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme Being thus to order and permit that moral evil to be, which it is best should come to pass. For that it is of good tendency, is the very thing supposed in the point now in question.-Christ's Crucifixion, though a most horrid fact in them that perpetrated it, was of a most glorious tendency as permitted and ordered of God.

3. Nor is there any need of supposing it proceeds from any evil disposition or aim; for by the supposition, what is aimed at is good, and good is the actual issue, in the final result of things.*

* From the whole strain of our author's defence of his principles, in reference to the existence of sin in the universe, though there are many excellent remarks interspersed, and sound reasoning as far as his data would admit, yet he is evidently embarrassed; makes concessions which his general principles of moral necessity did not require, and shelters himself under covers that afford him in reality no effectual protection. To say, that the existence of sin is only a common difficulty, which belongs to every hypothesis that though God is the author of sin 33

VOL. II.