Who Is Rational?: Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning
Integrating a decade-long program of empirical research with current cognitive theory, this book demonstrates that psychological research has profound implications for current debates about what it means to be rational. The author brings new evidence to bear on these issues by demonstrating that patterns of individual differences--largely ignored in disputes about human rationality--have strong implications for explanations of the gap between normative and descriptive models of human behavior. Separate chapters show how patterns of individual differences have implications for all of the major critiques of purported demonstrations of human irrationality in the heuristics and biases literature. In these critiques, it has been posited that experimenters have observed performance errors rather than systematically irrational responses; the tasks have required computational operations that exceed human cognitive capacity; experimenters have applied the wrong normative model to the task; and participants have misinterpreted the tasks.
In a comprehensive set of studies, Stanovich demonstrates that gaps between normative and descriptive models of performance on some tasks can be accounted for by positing these alternative explanations, but that not all discrepancies from normative models can be so explained. Individual differences in rational thought can in part be predicted by psychological dispositions that are interpreted as characteristic biases in people's intentional-level psychologies. Presenting the most comprehensive examination of individual differences in the heuristics and biases literature that has yet been published, experiments and theoretical insights in this volume contextualize the heuristics and biases literature exemplified in the work of various investigators.
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Chapter 2 Performance Errors and Computational Limitations
Chapter 3 The Inappropriate Norm Argument
Chapter 4 The Problem of Rational Task Construal
Chapter 5 DualProcess Theories and Evolutionary Adaptation Versus Normative Rationality
Chapter 6 Thinking Dispositions and Decontextualized Reasoning
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Who Is Rational?: Studies of individual Differences in Reasoning
Keith E. Stanovich
Limited preview - 1999
alternative analysis analytic argued argument evaluation assumption Baron base rate Bayesian behavior belief bias biases literature Cambridge chapter choice cognitive ability Cognitive Psychology computational limitations conjunction fallacy context correlations Cosmides covariation decontextualization deductive reasoning deontic descriptive models discussed displayed epistemic Evans evolutionary example experiment experimenter fallacy false consensus effect ﬁnding ﬁrst framing effect fundamental computational bias Gigerenzer goals heuristics and biases hindsight bias human rationality indicates individual differences inﬂuence intelligence intentional stance intentional-level interpretation irrationality Kahneman Linda Problem logic Meliorist need for cognition Nisbett non-normative nondeontic normative model normative rationality normative response normative/descriptive gap not-Q Oaksford one’s overconﬁdence Panglossian patterns perfect rationality performance errors positive prediction principles prior belief probability processes Psychology reasoning task reﬂective equilibrium selection task Slovic speciﬁc Stanovich and West statistical reasoning strategy subjects sunk cost Syllogisms syllogistic reasoning System Table task construal tendency theory thinking dispositions tion tional tive Tversky variables Wetherick