Book 2. the fame place; but if it hath fenfibly altered its distance with either of thofe points, we fay it hath changed its place: though vulgarly fpeaking, in the common notion of place, we do not always exactly obferve the deftance from thefe precife points; but from larger portions of fenfible objects, to which we confider the thing placed to bear relation, and its diftance from which we have fome reafon to obferve.

§. 8. Thus a company of chefs-men ftanding on the fame fquares of the chefs-board, where we left them, we fay they are all in the fame place, or unmoved; though perhaps the chefs-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another; because we compared them only to the parts of the chefs-board, which keep the fame diftance one with another. The chefs-board, we alfo fay, is in the fame place it was, if it remain in the fame part of the cabin, though perhaps the fhip, which it is in, fails all the while: and the fhip is faid to be in the fame place, fuppofing it kept the fame diftance with the parts of the neighbouring land; though perhaps the earth hath turned round; and fo both chefs-men, and board, and fhip, have every one changed place, in refpect of remoter • bodies, which have kept the fame diftance one with another. But yet the distance from certain parts of the board, being that which determines the place of the chefs-men; and the diftance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the comparison) being that which determined the place of the chefs-board; and the fixed parts of the earth, that by which we determined the place of the fhip; thefe things may be faid to be in the fame place in thofe refpects though : their diftance from fome other things, which in this matter we did not confider, being varied, they have undoubtedly changed place in that refpect; and we ourfelves fhall think fo, when we have occafion' to compare them with thofe other.

§. 9. But this modification of diftance we call place, being made by men, for their common ufe, that by it they might be able to defign the particular pofition of things, where they had occafion for fuch defignation:

men

men confider and determine of this place, by reference to thofe adjacent things which beft ferved to their prefent purpose, without confidering other things, which to answer another purpose would better determine the place of the fame thing. Thus in the chefs-board, the ufe of the defignation of the place of each chefs-man, being determined only within that chequered piece of wood, it would crofs that purpofe, to measure it by any thing elfe but when thefe very chefs-men are put up in a bag, if any one fhould ask where the black king is, it would be proper to determine the place by the parts of the room it was in, and not by the chefsboard; there being another ufe of defigning the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the chefsboard, and fo must be determined by other bodies. So if any one fhould afk, in what place are the verfes, which report the story of Nifus and Euryalus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by faving, they were in fuch a part of the earth, or in Bodley's library: but the right defignation of the place would be by the parts of Virgil's works; and the proper anfwer would be, that thefe verfes were about the middle of the ninth book of his neid; and that they have been always conftantly in the fame place ever since Virgil was printed; which is true, though the book itself hath moved a thousand times; the ufe of the idea of place here being to know in what part of the book that story is, that fo upon occafion we may know where to find it, and have recourfe to it for ufe...

§. 10. That our idea of place is nothing Place. elfe but fuch a relative pofition of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we confider that we can - have no idea of the place of the universe, though we can of all the parts of it, because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, diftinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform fpace or expanfion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to say, that the world is fomewhere, means no more than that it does exift: this, though a

L 4

phrafe

>phrafe borrowed from place, fignifying only its exiftence, not location; and when one can find out, and frame in his mind, clearly and diftinctly, the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or ftands ftill in the undiftinguishable inane of infinite fpace: though it be true, that the word place has fometimes a more confused fenfe, and ftands for that space which any body takes up; and fo the universe is in a place. The idea therefore of place we have by the fame means that we get the idea of fpace, (whereof this is but a particular limited confideration) viz. by our fight -and touch: by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extenfion or diftance.

-Extenfion

the fame.

*

3.1. There are fome that would perand body not fuade us, that body and extension are the fame thing; who either change the fignification of words, which I would not fufpect them of, they having fo feverely condemned the philofophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obfcurity of doubtful or infignificant terms. If therefore they mean by body and extenfion the fame that other people do, viz. by body, vfomething that is folid and extended, whofe parts are feparable and moveable different ways; and by extenfion, only the fpace that lies between the extremities of thofe folid coherent parts, and which is poffeffed by them: they confound very different ideas one with anosther. For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as diftinct from that of folidity, as it is from the idea of fcarlet colour? It is true, folidity cannot exist without extenfion, neither can fcarlet colour exift without extenfion: but this hinders not, but that they are diftinct ideas. Many ideas require others as neceffary to their existence or conception, which yet are very diftinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without fpace; and yet, motion is not space, nor space motion: fpace can reixft without it, and they are very distinct ideas; and fo, I think, are those of space and folidity. Solidity is fo infeparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of fpace, its contact, impulfe, and

com

communication of motion upon impulfe. And if it be a reason to prove, that fpirit is different from body, becaufe thinking includes not the idea of extenfion in it; the fame reafon will be as valid, I fuppofe, to prove that space is not body, because it includes not the idea of folidity in it: fpace and falidity being as diftinct ideas, as thinking and extenfion, and as wholly feparable in the mind one from another. Body then and extenfion, it is evident, are two diftinct ideas. For,

.

§. 12. First, Extenfion includes no folidity, nor refiftance to the motion of body, as body does.

§. 13. Secondly, The parts of pure fpace are infeparable one from the other; fo that the continuity cannot be feparated neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even fo much as in thought. To divide and feparate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two fuperficies, where before there was a continuity and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two fuperfices, where before there was a continuity, and confider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things confidered by the mind as capable of being feparated; and by feparation, of acquiring new diftinct fuperficies, which they then have not, but are capable of; but neither of these ways of feparation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure space.

It is true, a man may confider fo much of such a fpace, as is answerable or commenfurate to a foot, without confidering the reft; which is indeed a partial confideration, but not fo much as mental feparation, vor divifion; fince a man can no more mentally divide, without confidering two fuperficies feparate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two fuperficies disjoined one from the other: but: a partial confideration is not feparating. A man may confider, light in the fun, without its heat; for mobility in body, without its extenfion, without thinking of their feparation. One is only a partial confideration, terminating

terminating in one alone; and the other is a confidera-tion of both, as exifting separately.

§. 14. Thirdly. The parts of pure space are immoveable, which follows from their infeparability; motion being nothing but change of diftance between any two things: but this cannot be between parts that are infeparable; which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.

Thus the determined idea of fimple space distinguishes it plainly and fufficiently from body; fince its parts are infeparable, immoveable, and without refift-ance to the motion of body.

The defini

it not.

§. 15. If any one afk me, what this fpace, tion of exten- I fpeak of, is? I will tell him, when he fion explains tells me what his extenfion is. For to say, as is ufually done, that extenfion is to have partes extra partes, is to fay only, that extenfion is extenfion: for what am I the better informed in the na-ture of extenfion, when I am told, that extenfion is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i.e. extenfion confifts of extended parts? As if one afking, what a fibre was? I fhould answer him, that it was a thing made up of feveral fibres : would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reafon to think, that my defign was to make fport with him, rather than feriously to inftruct him?

Divifion of beings into bodies and

fpirits, proves not fpace and body the fame.

§. 16. Those who contend that space and body are the fame, bring this dilemma: either this fpace is fomething or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they muft neceffarily touch: if it be allowed to be fomething, they afk, whether it be body or fpirit? To which I answer, by another question, who told them that there was, or could be nothing but folid beings, which could not think, and thinking beings that were not extended? which is all they mean by the terms body and fpirit.