ceived. For to imprint any thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, feems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have fouls, have minds, with those impreffions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and neceffarily know and affent to thefe truths; which fince they do not, it is evident that there are no fuch impreffions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To fay a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the fame time to fay, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impreffion nothing. No propofition can be faid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet confcious of. For if any one may, then, by the fame reason, all propofitions that are true, and the mind is capable of ever affenting to, may be faid to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: fince, if any one can be faid to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must. be only, because it is capable of knowing it, and fo the mind is of all truths it ever fhall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever fhall know: for a man may live long, and, die at last in ignorance of many truths, which his mind. was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing, be the natural impreffion contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of fpeaking, which, whilft it pretends to affert the contrary, fays nothing different from thofe, who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing feveral truths. The capacity, they fay, is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then to what end fuch conteft for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can fee no difference there can be, between any truths the mind is capable of knowing, in refpect of their original: they must all be innate, or all adventitious: in vain shall a man go about to diftinguish them. He 3 therefore,

therefore, that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any diftinct fort of truths) mean fuch truths to be in the understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words (to be in the understanding) have any propriety, they fignify to be understood: fo that, to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind, and never to be perceived; is all one, as to fay, any thing is, and is not, in the mind or underftanding. If therefore thefe two propofitions, "whatfoever is, is ;" and "it is impoflible for the fame thing to be, and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have fouls, muft neceffarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and affent to it.

That men know them

when they come to the ufe of reafon, anfwered.

§. 6. To avoid this, it is ufually anfwered, That all men know and affent to them, when they come to the use of reason, and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer,

§. 7. Doubtful expreffions, that have fcarce any fignification, go for clear reafons, to thofe, who being prepoffeffed, take not the pains to examine, even what they themselves fay. For to apply this anfwer with any tolerable fenfe to our prefent purpose, it muft fignify one of these two things; either, that, as foon as men come to the ufe of reafon, these fuppofed native inscriptions come to be known, and obferved by them or elfe, that the ufe and exercife of men's reafon affifts them in the difcovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

If reafon difcovered them, that would not prove them

§. 8. If they mean, that by the use of reafon men may difcover thefe principles; and that this is fufficient to prove them innate their way of arguing will stand thus, (viz.) that, whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly affent to, thofe are all naturally imprinted on the mind: fince that univerfal affent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this; that by the use of reason, we are capable to come to a certain knowledge

innate.

of,

of, and affent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: All must be equally allowed innate; they being all difcoveries made by the ufe of reafon, and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.

$.9. But how can thefe men think the ufe It is falfe that reafon difcoof reafon neceifary, to difcover principles vers them. that are fuppofed innate, when reafon (if we may believe them) is nothing elfe but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles, or propofitions, that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of reafon to difcover; unless, as I have faid, we will have all the certain truths, that reafon ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reafon necessary to make our eyes difcover vifible objects, as that there fhould be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the underftanding fee what is originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it. So that to make reaíon difcover thofe truths thus imprinted, is to fay, that the use of reafon discovers to a man what he knew before: and if men have those innate impreffed truths originally, and before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them, till they come to the use of reafon; it is in effect to say, that men know, and know them not, at the fame time.

§. 10. It will here perhaps be faid, that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not affented to, as foon as propofed, wherein they are diftinguished from thefe maxims, and other innate truths. Ifhall have occafion to fpeak of affent, upon the first propofing, more particularly by and by. I fhall here only, and that very readily allow, that these maxims and mathematical demonftrations are in this different; that the one have need of reafon, ufing of proofs, to make them out, and to gain our affent; but the other, as foon as understood, are, without any the leaft reasoning, embraced and affented to. But I withal beg leave to obferve, that it lays open the weakness of YOL, I.

this

this fubterfuge, which requires the ufe of reafon for the discovery of these general truths: fince it must be confeffed, that in their difcovery there is no use made of reafoning at all. And I think thofe, who give this anfwer, will not be forward to affirm, that the knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be," is a deduction of our reafon. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they feem fo fond of, whilft they make the knowledge of thofe principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reafoning is fearch, and cafting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable fenfe be fuppofed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reafon, fhould need the ufc of reafon to discover it?

§. 11. Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find, that this ready affent of the mind to fome truths, depends not, either on native infcription, or the ufe of reafon; but on a faculty of the mind quite diftinct from both of them, as we. fhall fee hereafter. Reason, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our affent to these maxims, if by faying, that men know and affent to them, when they come to the ufe of reafon, be meant, that the ufe of reafon affifts us in the knowledge of thefe maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

The coming to the ufe of reason, not the time we cometo know thefe maxims

§. 12. If by knowing and affenting to them, when we come to the ufe of reafon, be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that, as foon as children come

to the ufe of reafon, they come alfo to know and affent to thefe maxims; this alfo is falfe and frivolous. First, It is falfe: Because it is evident thefe maxims are not in the mind fo early as the use of reafon: and therefore the coming to the ufe of reafon is falfly affigned, as the time of their discovery. How many inftances of the ufe of reafon may we obferve in children, a long time before they have any knowledge

of

of this maxim, "That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be?" And a great part of illiterate people, and favages, pafs many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general propofitions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abftract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reafon; and I add, nor then neither. Which is fo, becaufe, till after they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which thofe general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles; but are indeed difcoveries made, and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the fame way, and difcovered by the fame fteps, as feveral other propofitions, which nobody was ever fo extravagant as to fuppofe innate. This I hope to make plain in the fequel of this difcourfe. I allow therefore a neceffity, that men should come to the use of reafon before they get the knowledge of thofe general truths; but deny, that men's coming to the ufe of reafon is the time of their discovery.

By this they are not dif tinguished from other knowable

truths.

§. 13. In the mean time it is obfervable, that this faying, That men know and affent to these maxims, when they come to the ufe of reason, amounts in reality of fact to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the ufe of reason, but may poffibly be affented to, fome time after, during a man's life; but when, is uncertain: and fo may all other knowable truths, as well as thefe; which therefore have no advantage nor diftinction from others, by this note of being known when we come to the use of reafon; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

§. 14. But, fecondly, were it true, that the precife time of their being known, and affented to, were, when men come to the ufe of reafon, neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the fuppofition of itself is falfe. For by what kind of logic will it appear, C 2

If coming to the ufe of the time of their difco

reafon were

very,itwould

not prove

them innate.

that