those who are waking: but in this retirement of the mind from the fenfes, it often retains a yet more loofe and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming: and, laft of all, found fleep clofes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own obfervation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that fince the mind can fenfibly put on, at feveral times, feveral degrees of thinking, and be fometimes even in a waking man fo remifs, as to have thought's dim and obfcure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last, in the dark retirements of found fleep, lofes the fight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever: fince, I fay, this is evidently fo in matter of fact, and conftant experience, I afk whether it be not probable that thinking is the action, and not the effence of the foul? fince the operations of agents will cafily admit of intention and remission, but the effences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by the by.

§. I.

A

С Н А Р. XX.

MNQACIÓN SIMARRO MBUOTEGA

Of Modes of Pleafure and PaiADRIÐ

Pleafure and pain fimple ideas.

MONGST the fimple ideas, which we receive both from sensation and reflection, pain and pleasure are two very confiderable ones. For as in the body there is fenfation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure; fo the thought or perception of the mind is fimply fo, or elfe accompanied alfo with pleafure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. Thefe, like other fimple ideas, cannot be defcribed, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the fenfes, only by experience. For to define them by the prefence of good or evil, is no otherwife to make them known to us, than

by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the feveral and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or confidered by us.

Good and evil, what.

§. 2. Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or elfe to procure or preferve us the poffeffion of any other good, or abfenfe of any evil. And on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us; or elfe to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleafure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly diftinguifhed; though in truth they be only different conftitutions of the mind, fometimes occafioned by disorder in the body, fometimes by thoughts of the mind.

Our paffions moved by good and evil.

§. 3. Pleasure and pain, and that which caufes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our paffions turn: and if we reflect on ourselves, and obferve how thefe, under various confiderations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal fenfations (if I may fo call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our paffions.

Love.

§. 4. Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight, which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love. For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in fpring, when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health or conftitution deftroy the delight of their taste, and he then can be faid to love grapes no longer. §. 5. On the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing prefent or abfent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred. Were it my business here to inquire any farther than into the bare ideas of our paffions, as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain, I fhould remark,

Hatred.

that

that our love and hatred of inanimate infenfible beings, is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their ufe and application any way to our fenfes, though with their deftruction: but hatred or love, to beings capable of happiness or mifery, is often the uneafinefs or delight, which we find in ourfelves arifing from a confideration of their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends, producing conftant delight in him, he is faid conftantly to love them. But it fuffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the difpofitions of the mind, in respect of pleasure and pain in general, however caufed in us.

$. 6. The uneafinefs a man finds in him- Defire. felf upon the abfence of any thing, whofe prefent enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call defire; which is greater or lefs, as that uneafiness is more or lefs vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of fome ufe to remark, that the chief, if not only fpur to human industry and action, is uneafinefs. For whatsoever good is propofed, if its abfence carries no difpleasure or pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is no defire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term used to fignify the lowest degree of defire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is fo little uneafinefs in the abfence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than fome faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous ufe of the means to attain it. Defire alfo is ftopped or abated by the opinion of the impoffibility or unattainablenefs of the good propofed, as far as the uneafinefs is cured or allayed by that confideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it seasonable in this place.

§. 7. Joy is a delight of the mind, from Joy. the confideration of the prefent or affured approaching poffeffion of a good: and we are then poffeffed of any good when we have it fo in our power, that we can use it when we pleafe. Thus a man almost ftarved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of using it: and a father, in whom the

very well-being of his children caufes delight, is always as long as his children are in fuch a state, in the poffcffion of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.

Sorrow.

§. 8. Sorrow is uneafinefs in the mind, upon the thought of a good loft, which might have been enjoyed longer; or the fenfe of a prefent evil.

Hope.

§. 9. Hope is that pleafure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

Fear.

fal us. Despair.

§. 10. Fear is an uneafiness of the mind; upon the thought of future evil likely to be

§. 11. Defpair is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in men's minds, fometimes producing uncafi. nefs or pain, fometimes reft and indolency.

Anger.

§. 12. Anger is uneafinefs or difcompofure of the mind, upon the receipt of any

injury, with a present purpose of revenge. Envy.

§. 13. Envy is an uneafinefs of the mind, caufed by the confideration of a good we defire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us.

What paffions all men have.

$. 14. These two laff, envy and anger, not being caused by pain and pleasure, fimply in themselves, but having in them fome mixed confiderations of ourfelves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them: but all the rest terminating purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men, For we love, defire, rejoice, and hope, only in refpect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in refpect of pain ultimately in fine, all thefe paffions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain fome way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred ufually to the fubject (at least if a sensible or voluntary

voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us, because the fear it leaves is a conftant pain: but we do not fo conftantly love what has done us good; because pleafure operates not fo ftrongly on us as pain, and because we are not fo ready to have hope it will do fo again. But this by the by.

Pleafure and

pain, what.

§. 15. By pleafure and pain, delight and uneafinefs, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever delight or uneafiness is felt by us, whether arifing from any grateful or unacceptable fenfation or reflection.

§. 16. It is farther to be confidered, that in reference to the paffions, the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered, and operates as a pleasure: and the lofs or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

Shame.

§. 17. The paffions too have most of them in most perfons operations on the body, and cause various changes in it; which not being always fenfible, do not make a neceffary part of the idea of each paffion. For fhame, which is an uneasinefs of the mind upon the thought of having done fomething which is indecent, or will leffen the valued esteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.

These in

ftances to how how our

ideas of the paffions are got from fenfation and

reflection.

§. 18. I would not be miftaken here, as if I meant this as a difcourfe of the paffions; they are many more than thofe I have here named: and those I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger, and more accurate difcourfe. I have only mentioned thefe here as fo many inftances of modes of pleasure and pain refulting in our minds from various confiderations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain more fimple than thefe, as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them; the pain of tender eyes, and the pleasure of mufick; pain from captious uninftructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational converfation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the fearch and difcovery of truth.

But