propofition can be found, that receives general affent as foon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate propofition, as well as this maxim, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be;" they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; thofe general· and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehenfions, than those of more particular felf-evident propofitions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted and affented to by the growing understanding. And as to the usefulness of thefe magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found fo great as is generally. conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully confidered.

Thefe maxims not being known fometimes till propofed,

proves them not innate.

§. 21. But we have not yet done with affenting to propofitions at first hearing and understanding their terms; it is fit we first take notice, that this, inftead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: fince it fuppofes, that feveral, who underftand and know other things, are ignorant of these principles, till they are propofed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with thefe truths, till he hears them from others. For if they were innate, what need they be propofed in order to gaining affent, when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impreffion, (if there were any fuch) they could not but be known before? Or doth the propofing them, print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If fo, then the confequence will be, that a man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that these principles may be made more evident to us by others teaching, than nature has made them by impres fion; which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted

acquainted with many of these self-evident truths, upon their being proposed: but it is clear, that whofoever does fo, finds in himself, that he then begins to know a propofition, which he knew not before; and which, from thenceforth, he never queftions: not because it was innate, but because the confideration of the nature. of the things contained in those words, would not suffer him to think otherwife, how, or whenfoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is affented, to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must pafs for an innate principle, every well-grounded obfervation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only fagacious heads light at firft on these obfervations, and reduce them into general propofitions, not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance, and reflection on particular inftances. Thefe, when obferving men have made them, unobferving men, when they are propofed to them, cannot refufe their. affent to.

Implicitly known before propofing, fignifies, that

the mind is capable of understanding them, or elfe fignifies nothing,

§. 22. If it be faid, "the understanding hath an implicit knowledge of these principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing," (as they muft, who will fay, "that they are in the understanding before they are known") it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly; unless it be this, that the mind is capable of understanding and affenting firmly to fuch propofitions.. And thus all mathematical demonftrations, as well as first principles, muft be received as native impreffions on the mind: which I fear they will fcarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonftrate a propofition, than affent to it when demonftrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn, were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.

§. 23.

The argumeat of affenting on first hearing, is upon a falle fuppofition of no prece dent teach

ing.

§. 23. There is, I fear, this farther weaknefs in the foregoing argument, which would perfuade us, that therefore thofe maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at first hearing, because they affent to propofitions, which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonftration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms. Under which, there feems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are fuppofed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing de novo; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For first it is evident, that they have learned the terms, and their fignification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the cafe: the ideas themselves, about which the propofition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got, afterwards. So that in all propofitions that are affented to at first hearing, the terms of the propofition, their ftanding for fuch ideas, and the ideas themfelves that they ftand for, being neither of them innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in fuch propofitions, that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that propofition, whofe terms or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propofitions, made in fuch terms, whose fignification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or difagreement we can perceive in our ideas, when put together, is expreffed, we at first hearing affent; though. to other propofitions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas, not fo foon or fo eafily got, we are at the fame time no way capable of affenting. For though a child quickly affents to this propofition, "that an apple is not fire," when, by familiar acquaintance, he has got the ideas of thofe two different things diftinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire ftand for them; yet it will be fome years after, perhaps, beforè

the

the fame child will affent to this propofition, " that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be:" because that, though, perhaps, the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the fignification of them being more large, comprehenfive, and abstract, than of the names annexed to thofe fenfible things. the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precife meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind thofe general ideas they ftand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child affent to a propofition made up of fuch general terms: but as foon as ever he has got thofe ideas, and learned their names, he forwardly clofes with the one, as well as the other of the forementioned propofitions, and with both for the fame reason; viz. because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or difagree, according as the words ftanding for them, are affirmed or denied one of another in the propofition. But if propofitions be brought to him in words, which ftand for ideas he has not yet in his mind; to fuch propofitions, however evidently true or falfe in themselves, he affords neither affent nor diffent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty founds, any farther than they are figns of our ideas, we cannot but affent to them, as they correfpond to thofe ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the fhowing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of feveral degrees of affent, being the bufinefs of the following difcourfe, it may fuffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles.

Not innate, because not univerfally affented to.

§. 24. To conclude this argument of univerfal confent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, they muft needs have univerfal affent. For that a truth fhould be innate, and yet not affented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a man to know a truth, and be ignorant of it, at the fame time. But then, by these men's own confeffion, they cannot be innate; fince they are not affented to by thofe who un

derstand

derstand not the terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of thofe propofitions'; which, I think, is at leaft one half of mankind. But were the number far lefs, it would be enough to destroy univerfal affent, and thereby fhow thefe propofitions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

Thefe max

ims not the

first known.

§. 25. But that I may not be accufed to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what paffes in their understandings before they exprefs it; I fay next, that thefe two general propofitions are not the truths that firft poffefs the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions; which, if they were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think, and their words and actions do affure us that they do fo. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of affent, can it rationally be fuppofed, they can be ignorant of thofe notions that nature has imprinted, were there any fuch? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impreffions from things without, and be at the fame time ignorant of thofe characters which nature itfelf has taken care to ftamp within? Can they receive and affent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of thofe which are fuppofed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge, and future reafonings? This would be, to make nature take pains to no purpose; or, at leaft, to write very ill; fince its characters could not be read by thofe eyes, which faw other things very well; and thofe are very ill fuppofed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of feveral other things may be had. The child certainly knows, that the nurfe that feeds it, is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid